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#48:  The Use and Abuse of Liquidated Damages

9/29/2016

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Getting a project completed on time is often crucial to a commercial owner, who must forego the efficiencies or even the business opportunities which motivated him to build the longer the project is incomplete. Making delayed completion a breach of contract is all well and good, but proving the damages that will flow from such a breach can be difficult; the legal standard for recovery of damages requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that profits would have been realized or increased but for the delay, as well as reasonable certainty as to their probable amount.

It is precisely for such situations that liquidated damages clauses are used in many construction contracts. Damages are agreed to, or “liquidated,” in advance, usually in a particular amount per day of delay, thereby relieving the owner of the burden of proving actual damages. But because the law aims to make the non-breaching party whole and not give him a windfall, courts impose restrictions on the ability to recover liquidated damages – as a check against the possibility that the amount fixed by agreement may be wildly divergent from actual damages, thereby constituting a penalty. A liquidated damages clause will be enforceable if “(1) the damages anticipated as a result of the breach are uncertain in amount or difficult to prove; (2) the parties intended to liquidate damages in advance; and (3) the amount agreed upon is reasonable and not greatly disproportionate to the presumable loss or injury.” Holloway Automotive Group v. Lucic, 163 N.H. 6, 9-10 (2011).

The first two of these elements are rarely problematic in a construction contract. Almost always, the fight will be over the third element: was the liquidated amount reasonable? Our courts “employ a two-part test to determine whether a liquidated sum is reasonable. First, we assess whether the amount 'was a reasonable estimate of difficult-to-ascertain damages at the time the parties agreed to it.' Next, we ask whether actual damages are 'easily ascertainable' after a breach. '[I]f the actual damages turn out to be easily ascertainable, we must then consider whether the stipulated sum is unreasonable and grossly disproportionate to the actual damages from a breach.' If the stipulated sum is grossly disproportionate to easily ascertainable, actual damages, the provision is an unenforceable penalty, and the aggrieved party will be awarded no more than the actual damages.” Holloway, 163 N.H. at 10.

Let's break this down. The first inquiry is prospective as judged at the time of contracting: was the amount chosen a reasonable estimate of what appeared at the time to be hard to prove with precision? The second inquiry is retrospective: have subsequent events shown that actual damages are easy to prove – and if so, was the original estimate in the ballpark? Thus, the reasonableness of the estimate is judged both prospectively and retrospectively.

Most liquidated damages clauses are premised on delays in substantial completion rather than final completion. The reason is not hard to see: substantial completion is the stage of progress at which the project can be used by the owner for its intended purposes, and once the owner can use it, damages for delay no longer accrue. Nevertheless, I have seen contracts purporting to impose liquidated damages for late final completion, and even for late completion of interim milestones. Whether such provisions are enforceable in court is another matter. My guess is that these are likely to be deemed unenforceable penalties.

If a liquidated damages clause is unenforceable, the non-breaching party can still recover any proveable actual damages. General Linen Services, Inc. v. Franconia Investment Associates, L.P., 150 N.H. 595, 600 (2004). The more interesting question is whether a nonbreaching party can choose to sue for actual damages in the face of a valid liquidated damages clause. As long as the contract expressly gives an option to pursue either, the answer appears to be Yes – although “where an election is permitted, the election of one remedy bars pursuit of the other,” because “the right to recover liquidated damages and the right to recover actual damages are mutually exclusive remedies,” Orr v. Goodwin, 157 N.H. 511, 517 (2008). 
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#47:  Does New Hampshire Need a "Prompt Pay" Statute?

8/31/2016

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Every state except New Hampshire has enacted a so-called “Prompt Pay” statute for public construction projects, typically modeled on the federal statute (31 U.S.C. §§ 3901-3905), under which the government must pay the GC for satisfactory performance within 14 days of a requisition for payment and the GC must pay subs within 7 days from receipt of payment from the government. Nearly half of the states – including all three of New Hampshire's neighbors – make their Prompt Pay statutes applicable to private construction projects as well. Maine (10 M.R.S. §1113 et seq.) makes payments due according to the parties' contract, but if not outlined by contract, they are due 7 days after the prime contractor receives the sub's invoice or payment from the owner (whichever is later). Vermont (Tit. 9, §4001 et seq.) has the same deadlines, but does not permit them to be varied by contract.  Massachusetts (G.L. ch. 149, §29E), which limits its statute to projects of a value of $3,000,000 or more, requires a GC to approve or reject a sub's requisition within 22 days of submission (failure to act on it within that time is deemed an approval), and to pay subs within 52 days. All of these statutes impose varying interest and attorneys' fees penalties for failing to comply.

Should New Hampshire enact a Prompt Pay law for private construction jobs? I'd like to get readers' opinions on this, but my answer is “No.” New Hampshire has always placed a premium on freedom of contract, and parties are free to prescribe whatever payment terms they wish. Particularly when it comes to general contractor-subcontractor relations, the disparate bargaining strength between GC's and subs that motivates Prompt Pay laws elsewhere strikes me as less stark in New Hampshire.

Where I typically see unjustifiably delayed payments to subs is when an owner withholds payment to a GC for reasons unrelated to a particular sub's work, yet the cash-strapped GC withholds payment from that sub. Even this complication can be contracted around.

One thing I do like about Prompt Pay laws is their elimination of the “double filter” that some subcontract forms contain, requiring a sub to perform its work to the satisfaction not only of the owner and/or architect but of the GC as well, who will occasionally spot a problem that the owner/architect may fail to catch, yet decide nevertheless to requisition for the work. If a Prompt Pay law is in effect, payment to the GC for the sub's work effectively becomes the test of its acceptability for purposes of paying the sub until such time – if ever – that the owner wises up. Most commercial prime contracts include language to the effect that payment by the owner is not deemed acceptance of the work paid for (and many subcontracts bind the sub to the same provisions that bind the GC to the owner), so the possibility of a “claw back” for deficient work previously paid for still exists at both levels. Prompt Pay laws prevent the GC from using money paid by the owner for such work as a rainy day fund against such a possible claw back, thereby creating an incentive for the GC not to requisition for defective work in the first place.

Because a GC is not required to pay a sub when the GC has other legitimate offsets against a sub's pay req, Prompt Pay laws typically allow bona fide reasons for withholding payments to subs despite the GC's receipt of payment from the owner for that sub's work. (Vermont, for example, allows for “withholding an amount equaling the value of any good faith claims against an invoicing contractor.”) The penalties imposed by Prompt Pay laws up the ante for the GC whenever the sub sues for the money retained as a setoff by the GC; if its basis for withholding payment is not sustained by the courts, the question of whether the GC's “good faith” is a defense to liability under the statute, and if so whether such good faith even existed, comes to the fore. While the matter is debatable, I am far from convinced that this type of added risk imposed on GCs is sound public policy.

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#46:  Destruction of Work Prior to Completion

7/30/2016

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A contractor builds 90% of a building; it is destroyed by fire before he can finish. A subcontractor constructs 90% of a road; it gets washed out by a 100-year storm before the owner accepts it. Nobody has insurance. No contractual provision allocates the risk of loss. Who will bear that risk? Does the contractor have to start over on his own dime, or does the owner have to pay for the work performed? The answer may surprise you.

In Anderson v. Shattuck, 76 N.H. 240, 242 (1911), the plaintiff contractors “had already performed a substantial part of the work they contracted to do, when the fire destroyed the buildings.” Even though they weren't entitled to be paid under their contract (because they hadn't performed it), the Court found that “the labor and materials actually furnished by the plaintiffs were attached to the defendant's real estate as the work progressed and constituted a benefit to the defendant for which the plaintiffs are entitled to recover.” That was true even though “[t]here has been no breach of the express contract by the defendant, and neither party is in fault for the fire which put an end to the contract and caused the situation now existing between the parties. But justice does not require that they should remain in that situation, or that the contractors should be remediless, merely because they cannot maintain an action against the defendant upon the contract.” Invoking a legal doctrine called quantum meruit (literally “the amount deserved”), the Court awarded “an apportionment of so much of the agreed compensation to the contractor as he has earned in what he has done; he recovers such part of the entire amount as is equal to the part he has performed of the whole contract.” Id. at 243.

The owner in Anderson had obtained fire insurance, and the question arose as to whether the contractors were entitled to be paid from the insurance proceeds. The Court ruled that they were entitled. What if there had been no insurance? For all that appears in the case, the principle of quantum meruit still applies. This suggests that it is the owner, not the contractor, who bears the risk of loss to partially completed work where “neither party is at fault” for the loss.

Some courts distinguish contracts for improvements to an existing structure, whose destruction made completion of the contract for improvements impossible, and construction of a building from the ground up. A New Jersey case, Matthews Construction Company v. Brady, 140 A. 433, 434 (N.J. 1928), is typical:

"(b) Where under a contract for alterations and additions to an existing building performance depends on the continued existence of the structure, a condition is implied that impossibility of complete performance arising from its destruction without fault of the parties will absolve them from further liability, with the exception that the owner remains liable and the builder may recover for the value of the work done and materials delivered and accepted prior to such destruction. [citations omitted]
"(c) There is a distinction as to continuing liability under a building contract involving the erection of a new structure on land of the owner and that which relates to the making of additions and alterations to an existing building [the continuance of which is necessary to complete the contract] in the event of destruction without fault before completion. In the former case the builder remains liable for failure to complete, while in the latter both parties are relieved and the contract is at an end in that respect. [citations omitted]"

Thus far, New Hampshire has not adopted this distinction. Until it does, the rule seems to be that in the absence of a contract providing for a different rule, the risk of loss from unpreventable acts of God is on the owner, who must pay for construction he won't get to enjoy.
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#45:  OSHA: A Primer

7/1/2016

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For the first time since 1990, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (“OSHA”) has just increased its maximum penalties for rule violations. This is a good time to review the basics of OSHA enforcement.

OSHA rules on workplace safety include universal rules governing all industries, and industry-specific rules like those for the construction industry, codified at 29 CFR Part 1926.

Nationwide OSHA conducts about 35,000 inspections annually. Some are routine visits, some follow up on employee complaints or tips from whistleblowers, and others occur after mandatory reporting of a fatality (which must be reported within eight hours) or other serious accident such as loss of an eye or a limb (which must be reported within twenty-four hours). Legally, either the employer’s or owner’s permission, or a warrant, is required before an OHSA inspector may inspect a private facility or non-public work site. Given how easy it is to establish probable cause for a warrant in the non-criminal administrative setting, refusing a warrantless request to inspect may be unwise. OSHA inspectors have long memories, and refusals can end up painting a target on your back.

When OSHA inspectors show up, they will typically announce themselves to management and request permission or display a warrant to inspect all or part of a facility or work site; do a walk-around (which someone from management should always accompany); interview employees (sometimes privately, i.e., out of the presence of management); request documents (the OSH Act requires employers to keep records of employee injuries and illnesses, which must be made available on request without a subpoena); and confer with management (the “closing conference”) about any violations they spot. If violations can be abated immediately, it’s a good idea to do so before the inspector leaves.

OSHA has six months after the inspection to issue citations for any violations found. Citations will list the rule violated, the classification of the offense (e.g., “serious,” “repeat,” “willful”), the date by which the condition must be abated, and the proposed penalty – which effective August 1, 2016, can be up to $12,471 per “serious” violation and $124,709 per “repeat” or “willful” violation. Citations proposing the maximum penalty, however, are relatively rare. The OSH Act requires that in assessing penalties, “due consideration” must be given to four criteria: the size of the employer’s business, the gravity of the violation, the employer’s good faith, and any prior history of violations. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j).

Within fifteen work days of receiving a citation, an employer may request an informal conference with the OSHA Area Director, either in an effort to settle (the Area Director has authority to downgrade classifications and negotiate penalties) or simply to gather information. Within those same fifteen work days, an employer must give OSHA written notice that a citation is being contested.

If a citation is contested, a trial will be scheduled before an administrative law judge, whose decision is then reviewable by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, whose decision is, in turn, appealable to the United States Court of Appeals. At the trial, the burden is on OSHA to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “(1) that the cited standard applies; (2) that there was a failure to comply with the standard; (3) that employees had access to the violative condition; and (4) that the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the violation.” P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 675 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2012). The knowledge element is often challenged, but rarely successfully. In particular, “an employer can be charged with constructive knowledge of a safety violation that supervisory employees know or should reasonably know about.” P. Gioioso, id. at 73.

Lastly, a word of warning to GCs: keep an eye on your subs! OSHA “may issue citations to general contractors at construction sites who have the ability to prevent or abate hazardous conditions created by subcontractors through the reasonable exercise of supervisory authority regardless of whether the general contractor created the hazard...or whether the general contractor’s own employees were exposed to the hazard.” Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2009).
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#44:  Mechanic's Lien vs. Construction Mortgage

6/18/2016

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A few months ago I blogged on the priority of mortgages over later-filed mechanic's liens, pointing out that while priority as between a mechanic’s lien and a conventional mortgage is determined by filing order, priority as between a mechanic’s lien and a construction mortgage is determined by RSA 447:12-a. The finer points of that statute are worth examining.

The general rule is that later-filed mechanic's liens jump ahead of construction mortgages in priority. There are two exceptions. A construction mortgage achieves priority “to the extent that the mortgagee shows that the proceeds of the mortgage loan were disbursed either toward payment of invoices from or claims due subcontractors and suppliers of materials or labor for the work on the mortgaged premises, or upon receipt by the mortgagee from the mortgagor or his agent of an affidavit that the work on the mortgaged premises for which such disbursement is to be made has been completed and that the subcontractors and suppliers of materials or labor have been paid for their share of such work, or will be paid out of such disbursement.“

The language about disbursements “toward payment of invoices from or claims due subcontractors and suppliers of materials or labor” and affidavits “that the subcontractors and suppliers of materials or labor have been paid” immediately raises a question: what about payments to the GC? It is easy to miss the fact that the statute does not include such payments for purposes of achieving mortgage priority. In re Moultonborough Hotel Group, 726 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2013), did just that, allowing payments to a GC to establish a construction mortgagee's priority under the statute. Other courts have been more literal. Ransco Company, Inc. v. FDIC, No. C-89-562-JD (D.N.H. September 8, 1994), explicitly ruled that “the phrase 'subcontractors and suppliers of labor or material' as used in NH RSA 447:12-a does not include general contractors,” and dismissed the lender's claim of priority based on its payments to the GC.

That payments to general contractors are not included as yielding priority to the mortgagee is no legislative oversight. The GC is the party to whom a lender's disbursements are normally made (whether directly or through the owner/borrower), and it is a simple matter for owner or lender to swap a check for the GC's lien waiver. The lender needs no statutory protection here. Not so with subs and suppliers, who may be unknown to the owner and lender. This is why RSA 447:12-b requires subs and suppliers to identify themselves in writing to the lender, who can then make sure they are getting paid as well. If the subs and suppliers fail to give written notice, they won't lose their liens because of it. But the statute would hardly make sense if they didn't lose their priority because of it. That issue will have to await a test case.

The second exception – allowing the construction mortgagee to achieve priority as long as the owner swears that subs and suppliers “have been paid for their share of such work, or will be paid out of such disbursement“ – is more problematic. While the last sentence of RSA 447:12-a makes a willfully false oath a crime, that doesn't ensure accuracy – particularly when it comes to sworn statements about what will happen as opposed to what has happened. Relieving lenders of the burden of ascertaining the truth here is troublesome because it weakens the first exception, by dispensing with the need to “show” that subs and suppliers have been paid in favor of a reasonable belief that they have been paid. Chalk one up for the bank lobby!

The most cryptic sentence of the statute, however, is this one: “The precedence provided by this section shall not apply to wage claims of employees working for wages under an employer-employee relationship, as defined in RSA 275:42.” It's nice to see confirmation that employees have mechanic's lien rights, but if you asked me what precedence is being declared inapplicable here – the general rule or the two exceptions to it – I'd have to plead ignorance.

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#43:  See No Evil: The Design Professional's Liability for Construction Defects

5/21/2016

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When an Architect or Engineer wears her “Contract Administrator” hat, her duties to the Owner are set out in her contract of hire, typically including such roles as approving pay requisitions and change orders, shop drawing review, scheduling changes, certifying substantial completion – and rejecting deficient work.  Suppose she fails to catch the contractor’s poor workmanship.  Will she liable to the Owner?
 
A typical contract of hire for a design professional is the AIA Document B141 (2007).  Section 3.6.1.2 provides:
 
“The Architect shall not have control over, charge of, or responsibility for the construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, or for safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work, nor shall the Architect be responsible for the Contractor’s failure to perform the Work in accordance with the requirements of the Contract Documents.  The Architect shall be responsible for the Architect’s negligent acts or omissions, but shall not have control over or charge of, and shall not be responsible for, acts or omissions of the Contractor or of any other persons or entities performing portions of the Work.”
 
Section 3.6.2.1 provides:
 
“The Architect shall visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage of construction, or as otherwise required in Section 4.3.3, to become generally familiar with the progress and quality of the portion of the Work completed, and to determine, in general, if the Work observed is being performed in a manner indicating that the Work, when fully completed, will be in accordance with the Contract Documents.  However, the Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work.  On the basis of the site visits, the Architect shall keep the Owner reasonably informed about the progress and quality of the portion of the Work completed, and report to the Owner (1) known deviations from the Contract Documents and from the most recent construction schedule submitted by the Contractor, and (2) defects and deficiencies observed in the Work.”
 
Design professionals like to think that these two clauses amount to this: “Owner, you’re paying me to visit the site from time to time and look for problems, but I can’t see everything.  If my trained eye happens to spot a construction defect, I’ll report it, and reject it.  If I don’t happen to spot it, though, I’m not on the hook for it.”  Actually, matters are not quite that harsh.  The Owner is, after all, hiring a trained eye, and is entitled to the fruits of that training.  If a reasonably careful design professional would have spotted a defect, failure to catch it is negligence.
 
Proving that a design professional should reasonably have noticed a defect – typically through expert testimony – is only the first step to recovery.  The next step is proving proximate cause, i.e., that “that the injury would not have occurred but for the negligent conduct,” and “that the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm,” Carignan v. New Hampshire Intern. Speedway, Inc., 151 N.H. 409, 414 (2009).  If the “harm” in negligent inspection cases were the poor construction itself, this would be impossible to prove.  But if the "harm" is the loss of an owner's bargained-for opportunity to catch and correct that poor construction before it comes home to roost, proof gets easier.
 
And that is indeed the case.  In Corson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 110 N.H. 210 (1970), a factory employee who was injured by malfunctioning machinery sued the insurance carrier that had undertaken to inspect it, claiming that “proper inspection would have prevented the malfunction.”  Our Supreme Court quoted “the language of Cardozo, Ch. J., in Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., Inc., 245 N.Y. 256, 259, 157 N.E. 129, 130: ‘His case is made out when it appears that by reason of such negligence what was wrong is still wrong, though prudence would have made it right. . . The inference is permissible that the (defendant’s conduct) cloaked the defect, dulled the call to vigilance, and so aggravated the danger.’”  That is enough to impose liability.

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#42:  Mechanic's Lienor vs. Mortgagee: Who Has Priority?

4/26/2016

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Sorting out the “priority” of creditor claims against a piece of real estate―the pecking order when the asset is sold―can occasionally be a thorny task.  Whether the creditor’s claim is secured with the owner’s consent (i.e., mortgages) or without it (e.g., court-ordered attachments, tax liens, condominium assessment liens, commercial real estate broker liens), in all cases some instrument must be recorded at the registry of deeds―and it would be a simple matter for the law to declare that in all cases the order of recording establishes priority.  That is indeed the general rule; see RSA 477:3-a, providing that any “instrument which affects title to any interest in real estate” must be recorded and “shall not be effective as against bona fide purchasers for value until so recorded.”  But there are some exceptions which allow a later-recorded interest to achieve priority over an earlier-recorded one.
 
In determining whether mechanic’s liens are such an exception, RSA 447:9 is the starting point: “The lien created by RSA 447:2-7, inclusive, shall continue for 120 days after the services are performed, or the materials, supplies or other things are furnished, unless payment therefor is previously made, and shall take precedence of all prior claims except liens on account of taxes.”  On first blush, this appears to declare that a mechanic’s lien always trumps an earlier-recorded mortgage.  But appearances can be deceiving.

Consider RSA 479:3, which provides: “Subject to the provisions on priority in RSA 447:12-a, a recorded mortgage takes priority as of the date of its recording as to advances or obligations thereafter made or incurred that do not exceed the maximum amount stated in the mortgage.”  With exceptions found in RSA 447:12-a (I’ll deal with that statute in a moment), RSA 479:3 thus allows a mortgage recorded on Day 1 to retain whatever priority it may have over any interest recorded on Day 2 even as to mortgage advances made on Day 3.  Standing alone, this says nothing about relative priorities between the Day 1 and Day 2 recordings.  But Earnshaw v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 109 N.H. 283 (1969), does.  Construing an earlier version of RSA 479:3 (before enactment of RSA 447:12-a), the Court ruled that a construction loan mortgage had priority over a later-recorded mechanic's lien, even as to advances made after the lien attached.

With a few exceptions, RSA 447:12-a provides that a mechanic’s lien “shall have precedence and priority over any construction mortgage.”  Before concluding that this is just a redundancy given RSA 447:9, it would be well to consider our Supreme Court’s statement that “without RSA 447:12-a (Supp. 1975) prior law would have given the construction mortgage of defendant priority over Sullivan's mechanic's lien,” L. M. Sullivan Co., Inc. v. Essex Broadway Savings Bank, 117 N.H. 985 (1977).  Even more telling is Lewis v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 139 N.H. 50, 52 (1994), which allowed a mortgage to trump a mechanic’s lien as to the portion of the mortgage loan that was not for construction purposes: “The statute only provides priority over prior mortgages based on construction loans. Therefore, if the defendant's loan is regarded as a ‘mixed’ loan (i.e., its purpose is to finance not only construction, but also land acquisition or discharge of mortgages on land), then, under the race-notice rule of priority, the defendant would enjoy priority with respect to non-construction disbursements.”

As I said, appearances can be deceiving.  RSA 447:9’s “shall take precedence of all prior claims” does not include prior mortgages.  Priority as between a mechanic’s lien and a construction mortgage is determined by RSA 447:12-a.  But priority as between a mechanic’s lien and a conventional mortgage is determined by the general first-to-file rule.  If RSA 447:9 was the Legislature’s effort to give mechanic’s liens priority over earlier mortgages, it forgot about 477:3-a, thus leaving to the courts the task of resolving inconsistent statutes.  And the courts have come down in favor of the mortgage holder―who would be no worse off if priority were given to a subsequent mechanic’s lien for labor and materials that added value to the real estate equal to the amount of the lien.  A rising tide lifts all boats.

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#41:  Contractor vs. Mortgagee: Who Gets the Insurance Proceeds?

4/2/2016

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An insured building is damaged by fire or other casualty.  The owner files an insurance claim and hires a contractor to make repairs, promising to use the insurance proceeds for that purpose.  The contractor does the work before the insurance proceeds are received.  When the insurance check arrives, it is payable to both the owner and the owner’s mortgage lender – who refuses to allow it to be disbursed to pay the contractor despite the pleas of the owner.  When the owner can’t pay him, the contractor puts a mechanic’s lien on the property – and sues both the owner for breach of contract and the mortgage company for “unjust enrichment,” “constructive trust” and a host of other legal theories they teach in law school.  Who wins?
 
Because a property and casualty insurance policy is personal to the policyholder and does not run with the insured property, a mortgage holder is not entitled to insurance proceeds simply because of its mortgage on the insured property.  The mortgagee does, however, have an "insurable interest" in the property (i.e., something of value to protect, without which the law regards an insurance policy as an illegal gambling contract), and it is common for mortgages to require mortgagors to obtain casualty insurance on the property payable to the mortgagee as “loss payee.”  
 
This same principle of personal contract rights as opposed to rights running with the land means that lien priorities with respect to the property do not determine the priority of competing claims to insurance proceeds.  See, e.g., Midland Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. J.P. Builders, 265 N.J.Super. 246, 626 A.2d 89, 91 (1993) (“Because of the personal nature of a contract of insurance, if an insurance policy is made expressly payable to a second mortgagee, the second mortgagee is entitled to the policy proceeds in preference to the holder of a first mortgage who is not listed as a loss payee under the policy.”).  Thus, resolving whether the mechanic’s lien or the mortgage has first dibs against the property won't determine who has first dibs on the insurance proceeds. 
 
Even though the insurance check is made payable to the mortgagee, the nature of insurance can tip the scales here.  Property insurance contracts are contracts of indemnity, and to the extent they result in a monetary benefit beyond reimbursement for the peril insured against – which is what happens once repairs have been made but aren’t paid for – they are pure windfalls.  A Maryland case, Cottman Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 169 Md. 595, 601-02, 182 A. 551 (1936), explains:
 
“It cannot be denied that if the restoration of the security, at the expense of the debtor, to the value it had before the loss or damage, leaves the parties in statu quo, then the retention of the insurance money by the creditor, mortgagee, or trustee, as additional security, would put the holder in a better position than he had originally bargained for. The theory of insurance, however, does not contemplate a resulting profit to the insured, or his mortgagee or other creditor. The interest of the mortgagee is to maintain the equilibrium of debt and security; and if, by the application of the insurance money to the upkeep of the security, that parity would be continued, it is not inequitable to require the payee of the fund to transfer the same to the debtor for that purpose, upon properly safeguarding its application to that end.”
 
If our courts take this approach, the mortgagee in our hypothetical has indeed been unjustly enriched contrary to the purposes of insurance, and should be required to hold the proceeds for the benefit of the contractor rather than apply them to the mortgage indebtedness.  There is every reason to think that our courts would require exactly that.  “An equitable lien may be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment in an owner whose property was improved, for the increased value of the property.”  Iacomini v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 127 N.H. 73, 78 (1985).  It is no stretch at all to deem the mortgagee to be the “owner” for such purposes.
 
Who wins?  Bet on the contractor.

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#40:  Contractual "Notice of Claim" Requirements

3/23/2016

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In construction settings, claims for adjustments in the contract price are endemic.  Most such claims are resolved short of arbitration or litigation.  But for that to happen, they obviously have to be raised by the claimant before the filing of a complaint or a demand for arbitration.   And if they are to have the best chance of being settled, claims need to be raised before the evidence on both sides goes stale (or gets covered up!) and before budget decisions on other changes are made.
 
It is thus common for construction contracts to include provisions for giving notice of claims promptly after the grounds for a claim is discovered.  Typical is the AIA A201 (2007) General Conditions §15.1.2: “Claims by either party must be made within twenty-one (21) days after occurrence of the event giving rise to such Claim or within twenty-one (21) days after the claimant first recognizes the condition giving rise to the Claim, whichever is later.”
 
Courts are sensitive to the rationale for such notice provisions.  Mountain Environmental, Inc. v. Abatement International/Advatex Associates, Inc., 149 N.H. 671, 674 (2003) (“the main purpose of a notice requirement is to provide parties with an opportunity to settle the claim without resorting to litigation”); Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. 554, 566-67 (1985) (“The notice of claim provision has two purposes: to allow the State to investigate claims promptly after an injury, and to permit the State to pursue settlement negotiations prior to the institution of suit”).  But courts also recognize that barring a claim completely due to late notice can be a harsh penalty.  Opinion of the Justices, 126 N.H. at 567 (“Although these are permissible objectives, the loss of rights of action for failure to satisfy the notice requirement is a penalty grossly disproportionate to these intended benefits”).
 
Two related questions need to be separated: (1) Does the failure to give timely notice of a claim result in forfeiting the claim? (2) Does the failure to give timely notice in the form required by the contract result in forfeiting the claim?  The answer to both questions is: maybe.
 
Some courts find that the failure to give contractually-required notice results in a waiver of the claim, based on the paramount principle of freedom of contract.  If the parties have bargained for notice as a precondition to maintaining a claim, courts are reluctant to rewrite the bargain.  See RCR Building Corporation v. Pinnacle Hospitality Partners, 2012 WL 5830587 at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012) (“the parties agreed to initiate Claims by utilizing this procedure, and it is not our role to judge the wisdom or folly of the agreement.”).  Other courts, however, focus on whether a party was aware of the facts giving rise to the claim despite not receiving notice from the other party.   Brinderson Corp. v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist., 825 F.2d 41, 44 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Generally, when the owner has actual or constructive notice of the conditions underlying the claim and an opportunity to investigate, that is sufficient.").  New Hampshire’s Supreme Court has yet to indicate which approach it favors, but its recognition of the beneficial purposes of notice suggests to me that the strict approach will be favored.  Notice of a claim is different from notice of the conditions or facts giving rise to that claim.  If it is to reap the benefits of its bargain for timely notice, a party is entitled to know that a claim is being made, not simply that grounds for such a claim exist.
 
Expect more leniency when the contract specifies written notice which hasn’t been given, but the party to be notified received oral notice of the claim.  In that situation, the absence of written notice will most likely be excused.  Couture v. Hebert, 93 N.H. 378, 380 (1945) (“The oral notice in the instant case gave the plaintiff all the information he would have received had a written notice been given”); In re Redondo Const. Corp., 678 F.3d 115, 123 (1st Cir. 2012) (“strict conformity with a contract’s written notice provision is not required as long as the counterparty receives substantially the same information through timely actual notice and suffers no prejudice from the non-conformity").
 
But why risk it?

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#39:  Assignments of Contractual Rights and Duties

2/22/2016

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When two parties enter into a contract to define their respective performances, they generally expect that those performances will not be handed off to others.  In the case of a construction contract, the reality is that contractors don’t care who pays them; money is fungible, and if it comes from an equally solvent third party rather than from the original owner, so be it.  But contractors are not as interchangeable as dollars; owners generally want the particular contractor they hired, even if most of the work ends up being subbed out.
 
The law reflects this common-sense expectation.  In the absence of a contract provision prohibiting assignment without the other party’s consent, assignments of contractual rights and duties are usually allowable.  But “when rights arising out of a contract are coupled with obligations to be performed by the contractor and involve such a relation of personal confidence that it must have been intended that the rights should be exercised and the obligations performed by him alone the contract including both his rights and his obligations cannot be assigned.”  Town of Hampton v. Hampton Beach Improvement Co., 107 N.H. 89, 95 (1966) (quoting 4 Corbin, Contracts, s. 865).

Sophisticated owners don’t leave such matters to chance; they insert provisions in their contracts to control when assignments can or will be made.  Typical is AIA Form A201 (2007) § 13.2.1: “Except as provided in Section 13.2.2, neither party to the Contract shall assign the Contract as a whole without the written consent of the other.”

Owners typically want not only the right to prevent contractors from assigning the contract to third parties, but also the right to receive an assignment of the contractors’ subcontracts in the event of default by the contractor.  The reason is not hard to fathom:  if a GC goes belly-up in the middle of a project, subs would otherwise be free to walk away.  The owner typically wants “good” subs to stay on, and wants the right to sue “bad” subs whose work is deficient but who cannot be sued for breach by an owner without “privity” of contract.  An assignment achieves that contractual link.  Hence, AIA Form A201 (2007) § 5.4.1:  “Each subcontract agreement for a portion of the Work is assigned by the Contractor to the Owner, provided that assignment is effective only after termination of the Contract by the Owner for cause pursuant to Section 14.2 and only for those subcontract agreements that the Owner accepts by notifying the Subcontractor and Contractor in writing . . .”
 
Lenders have a similar interest; if the owner defaults on a construction loan in the middle of a project, the lender typically wants the right to insist that the contractor finish the project – which is likewise accomplished by an assignment.  Hence, AIA Form A201 (2007) § 13.2.2:  “The Owner may, without the consent of the Contractor, assign the Contract to a lender providing construction financing for the Project, if the lender assumes the Owner’s rights and obligations under the Contract Documents.”
 
All of these provisions concern assignments of an entire contract (or what may be left of it), and deal with scenarios in which future performances are still required on both sides, i.e., an assignment of both rights and duties.  It is also possible to assign a right without the corresponding duty, for example the right to payment.  If part performance by one party has triggered the other’s obligation to pay, an assignment of that payment right must be honored by the payor upon notice of the assignment.  In the construction setting, that assignment will often be to a surety or to the contractor’s bank (or both, in which case the owner can simply pay the money into court and let the two assignees fight it out – perhaps with a side wager on the surety, American Employers Ins. Co. v. School District of Town of Newport, 99 N.H. 188 (1954)).  At that point the contractor is likely in trouble – and if the owner didn’t contract for retention of sufficient funds to complete punch list items or for a warranty holdback, it may be in trouble too.

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#38:  Are Attorneys' Fees and Interest Lienable?

2/3/2016

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When a plaintiff sues for money damages, he often seeks a lien or “attachment” on the defendant’s property – real estate being a particular favorite – as security for a judgment.  In New Hampshire, RSA 511-A:4 authorizes attachments “to the extent reasonably necessary to secure any judgment or decree which the plaintiff is likely to obtain” including “allowable interest and costs.” Such attachments are typically granted in an amount that will cover any contractual right to interest and attorneys’ fees.

Mechanic’s liens are perfected by attachments too.  What if the plaintiff’s contract includes the right to collect interest and attorneys’ fees?  Will the amount of his mechanic’s lien attachment include those things?  Our Supreme Court has yet to address this, but my answer is No ―although I’ve seen it happen a few times when overreaching plaintiffs and inattentive judges crossed paths.

Ideally, a mechanic’s lien statute should tell us what triggers the lien, what property is subject to the lien, and what debts it secures.  New Hampshire’s statute, RSA 447:2, is explicit on only first two of these: “If any person shall perform labor, provide professional design services, or furnish materials to the amount of $15 or more for erecting or repairing a house or other building or appurtenances, or for building any dam, canal, sluiceway, well or bridge, or for consumption or use in the prosecution of such work, other than for a municipality, by virtue of a contract with the owner thereof, he or she shall have a lien on any material so furnished and on said structure, and on any right of the owner to the lot of land on which it stands.”  Compare Massachusetts’ lien statute, G.L. c. 254 § 2, which gives general contractors a lien “to secure the payment of all labor, including construction management and general contractor services, and material or rental equipment, appliances, or tools which shall be furnished,” and G.L. c. 254 § 4, which gives subs and suppliers a lien “to secure the payment of all labor and material, which he is to furnish or has furnished.” This answers the third question.  See National Lumber Co. v. United Casualty & Surety Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 723, 726, 802 N.E.2d 82, 86 (2004) (“our inquiry is limited to whether a mechanic’s lien recorded pursuant to G. L. c. 254, s. 4, includes contractual interest and reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to the amount claimed for labor and materials. We conclude that it does not.”).

In the absence of express statutory language, the clincher for me is the underlying “value added” theory behind mechanic’s lien statutes.  When real estate is improved by labor and materials, it is presumed to increase in value, as measured by the price of the labor and materials.  It is fair to give the providers of labor and materials a lien to that extent because the owner is no worse off when his property is liened for the price of those unpaid goods and services.  The lien accomplishes a transfer of value from benefited owner to unpaid contractor or supplier in recognition of the value they added to the property.  Attorneys’ fees and interest, however, add no value to the property.  They are tools for making the contractor and supplier whole, but not for transferring a benefit realized by an owner back to the provider of the benefit.

Admittedly the presumption that property values increase by the contract price of improvements does not always hold.  I could have a piece of land worth $100,000 and hire you to build me a house at a price of $400,000 in the hope of having a $500,000 property when you’re done―but if you hit ledge digging the foundation hole and spend an extra $50,000 to remove it, I’ll owe you the extra $50K yet my home won’t be worth a penny more.  Justice Stevens’ observation is apt here: “As in every rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect,” but aberrations are “so unlikely to prove significant in any particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its general application.”  Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 344, 351 (1982).

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#37:  The GC's Liabiity Insurance: Is Faulty Workmanship Ever Covered?

1/11/2016

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When a contractor performs shoddy work, it is liable to the owner not only for (a) the cost of repairing or replacing the defective work, but for consequential damages to other property, including (b) the cost of repairing or replacing nondefective work already performed by the contractor, and (c) the cost of repairing or replacing other property of the owner that was never within the contractor’s scope of work.  In a previous blog, I noted that a contractor’s Commercial General Liability insurance policy clearly covers (c), and suggested that New Hampshire might follow the trend elsewhere by holding (b) to be covered.  But is there ever coverage for (a)?

The general rule is that “the commercial general liability policy covers claims for property damage caused by defective work, but not claims for repair of the defective work itself.”  Capstone Bldg. Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 67 A.3d 961, 982 (2013). Some courts reach this conclusion by holding that shoddy work is not “property damage,”  limiting that phrase to "property that is nondefective, and to damage beyond mere faulty workmanship.”  Taylor Morrison Services, Inc. v. Hdi-Gerling America Insurance Co., 293 Ga. 456, 746 S.E.2d 587, 591 (Ga. 2013).  Others, including New Hampshire, get there by holding that shoddy work is not a covered "occurrence," limiting coverage to "negligent construction that resulted in an occurrence, rather than an occurrence of negligent construction."  High Country Associates v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 139 N.H. 39, 45 (1994).

But what if the poor workmanship in question must be replaced in order to repair or replace other property which is covered?  In that scenario, must the insurer pay to fix the shoddy work?  The answer is: maybe.

Carithers v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 782 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2015), decided that the insurer must pay.  The plaintiffs were homeowners who were assigned their general contractor’s CGL policy after a number of construction defects were discovered, including “incorrect construction of a balcony, which allowed water to seep into the ceilings and walls of the garage leading to wood rot, caused property damage to the garage.”  Id. at 1244.  The court decided that “repairing the balcony was part of the cost of repairing the garage.”  Id. at 1251.

A similar decision is Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 432 S.W.3d 231 (Mo.App. 2014).  In that case, components of a defectively installed exterior cladding system were damaged by water intrusion, and removal of some or all of the exterior cladding system was necessary in order to repair water intrusion damage caused behind the walls.  The court decided, id. at 243: “Once defective construction causes damage, the cost to repair the damage is covered ‘property damage.’  That cost to repair damage may include the cost to replace the defective construction if it too has been damaged or must be removed to access other damaged areas.”

In Lennar Corp. v. Markel American Insurance Co., 413 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. 2013), the Texas Supreme Court found coverage for the cost of removing EIFS, conceded to be a defective product, in order to locate covered water damage to other parts of the structure. 

Decisions like these suggest a “back door” way to pass the costs of repairing or replacing defective work onto the insurer when other property that was damaged as a result of defective work cannot be addressed without also addressing the defective work itself.  Thus far no New Hampshire reported case has considered the question whether covered repair costs for consequential damages must be teased apart from the costs of repairing the defective work itself, or whether both costs can be passed on to the insurer when the defective work must be addressed in order to fix the consequential damages.

Lawyers love unsettled questions; it gives us a chance to be creative.  On this one, I'd rather have the carrier's side.

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#36:  The CM and Design Responsibility

12/18/2015

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In the “old” days, the standard format for construction contracts had the contractor taking a design dictated by the owner or the owner’s design team, bidding on it, and building it to the owner’s plans and specifications through the contractor’s choice of means and methods.  Design and construction were separate; the owner engaged an architect and/or engineer for the design and engaged a contractor for the construction.  In this system the owner warrants the sufficiency of the design to produce the intended product.  This often led to finger pointing when problems arose with the finished product, the contractor blaming the design and the designers blaming the construction.  See J. Sweet & M.M. Schneier, Legal Aspects of Architecture, Engineering and the Construction Process § 14.09E (9th ed. 2013) (“Owners are often frustrated when they look to the designer who claims that the contractor did not follow the design, with the latter claiming that the problem was poor design”).
 
Eventually a class of design-build contractors arose, offering owners one-stop shopping for both design and construction.  Even public works projects began to use design-build, with explicit legislative authority.  See RSA 21-I:80 (allowing the Commissioner of Administrative Services to use design-build for buildings included in capital projects); RSA 228:4 (allowing transportation improvement projects with a cost of up to $25,000,000 to use design-build). With this type of delivery system, finger pointing between builder and designer is eliminated for problems with the finished product; there is no owner warranty of the sufficiency of the design.   But the checks and balances inherent in having separate contracting entities, particularly the designer’s oversight role in an effort to protect the owner from corner-cutting contractors, was lost.
 
Construction management has become a popular “middle ground” alternative, with the CM acting as the owner’s agent to shepherd a project from design to completion.  Sometimes the CM will contract on the owner’s behalf with multiple prime contractors (who would have been deemed subcontractors under the traditional GC format) and also oversee their performance (a task which would have been performed by an architect or engineer under the traditional GC format) to ensure that each of them performs properly.  Sometimes the CM assumes the risk of nonperformance by those prime contractors and becomes directly liable to the owner for their errors in a manner virtually indistinguishable from a GC’s liability for subcontractor errors.  But in either case, the CM typically gets involved in the design through preconstruction services, sharing its construction expertise with the owner’s design team.  This synergy can be quite helpful.
 
Such sharing of design responsibility between the CM and the owner’s architect/engineer blurs the line between liability and nonliability for design defects.  One resolution is to assign responsibility to the party with ultimate responsibility, which will typically be the owner’s design team.  Another approach is to assign responsibility to the party suggesting the particular element of the design that is being challenged.  A third approach is to require reliance by the CM on the design provided by the owner’s design team, and factor in the extent of the CM’s involvement.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently adopted this approach in Coghlin Electrical Contractors Inc. v. Gilbane Building Company, 472 Mass. 549 (2015), which held that “[t]he CMAR’s level of participation in the design phase of the project and the extent to which the contract delegates design responsibility to the CMAR may affect a fact finder’s determination as to whether the CMAR's reliance was reasonable. The greater the CMAR’s design responsibilities in the contract, the greater the CMAR’s burden will be to show, when it seeks to establish the owner’s liability under the implied warranty, that its reliance on the defective design was both reasonable and in good faith.”
 
Which way New Hampshire’s courts will go is anyone’s guess; mine is that the Massachusetts approach will hold sway.  But the allocation of responsibility will always be informed by the contract language, and the CM and Owner are free to carve up responsibility as they see fit.

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#35:  Mechanic's Liens for Rental of Equipment: The Case of Osgood v. Kent

11/1/2015

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The New Hampshire mechanic’s lien law, RSA 447:2, allows a lien to those who “perform labor, provide professional design services, or furnish materials” on a construction project.  Unlike some states' mechanic's lien statutes (e.g., Massachusetts, Maine), there is no mention of rental of equipment―and equipment rental does not fit comfortably within these three categories.
 
If a contractor rents equipment from a leasing company to assist him in performing labor or furnishing materials to construct a project, our courts are consistent in allowing the contractor a lien for the full amount he is owed, including his rental costs―even if the contract is “cost plus” and the rental charges are separately identifiable.  In such a case the rented equipment is simply an adjunct cost of supplying the “labor” and “materials” mentioned in the statute.  But does the leasing company, who performed no labor and furnished no materials, have a lien as well?
 
Our Supreme Court has yet to speak on the issue.  Given the Court’s general reluctance to “consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include,” Appeal of Local Government Center, 165 N.H. 790, 804 (2014), asserting lien rights may be a difficult sell for the leasing company.  The effort isn’t aided by the Legislature’s rejection of House Bill 1759, introduced in 2006, which would have amended the statute to provide a lien to equipment suppliers.

There may, however, be a limited exception for rented equipment temporarily incorporated into the construction.  In Osgood v. Kent, No. 11-cv-477-SM,
2011 WL 6740411 (D.N.H. Dec. 21, 2011), a mechanic’s lien was upheld for rental costs of temporary shoring and cribbing on a project after the contractor was terminated but forbidden by the owners from removing the shoring and cribbing.  In considering the owners’ argument “that a mechanic’s lien does not arise from the rental of equipment that is not consumed or used in construction unless the applicable statute specifically authorizes it,” the Court focused on the language of RSA 447:2 allowing a lien for materials furnished “for consumption or use in the prosecution of such work.” This distinction between “consumption” and “use” persuaded the Court that “where the statute speaks of materials consumed, like concrete poured into a foundation, as well as materials otherwise used, the statute could well contemplate that the category of materials otherwise used would include equipment rented to a property owner.”
 
Importantly, the Court also distinguished the shoring and cribbing from rental equipment that is not “incorporated into” the work.  The Court distinguished several cases, principally Logan Equipment Corp. v. Profile Construction Co., Inc., 585 A.2d 73, 74 (R.I. 1991), in which the rental of excavation equipment was held not to be lienable because not incorporated into the improvement.  “Here, of course, the I-beams and cribbing are incorporated – if only temporarily – into Ogontz Hall, which is precisely why the Kents sent Osgood a letter forbidding him from removing his property from their premises.  Given the substantial differences between the excavators in Logan and the materials at issue here, and the nature of their respective uses, Logan is no obstacle to a determination that Osgood is entitled to a mechanic’s lien based on the Kents’ continuing use of his I-beams and cribbing.”  Bottom line: “In this case, until Osgood’s materials are removed from Ogontz Hall, that leased equipment is incorporated into the improvement . . . Thus, the rental fees for those materials may be secured by a mechanic’s lien.”

Osgood v. Kent is consistent with a prohibition against mechanic’s liens for rented equipment which is not temporarily “incorporated” into a project.  In my view, the Court confused “equipment” and “materials,” and could have reached the same result by characterizing the I-beams and cribbing as materials (which are expressly included in our mechanic’s lien statute) rather than equipment (which is not).  All things considered, I expect that New Hampshire courts will disallow liens for suppliers of rented equipment unless the Legislature amends the statute.

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#34:  Limiting Liability with a Corporation or LLC

10/16/2015

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In the construction business, as elsewhere, the days of sole proprietors acting in their own names are virtually gone.  Most everyone today incorporates their business or forms a Limited Liability Company in the expectation that this will protect them from personal liability in the event of a lawsuit.  But that expectation is not always borne out in practice.
 
For starters, a distinction must be drawn between contract liability and tort liability.  A shareholder or member "acting as an agent of [an LLC], is ... protected from personal liability for making a contract where acting within his authority to bind the [LLC],” Mbahaba v. Morgan, 163 N.H. 561, 565 (2012).  But there is no shield against liability for torts committed by the Company at the behest of whoever controls it.  “When, however, a member or manager commits or participates in the commission of a tort, whether or not he acts on behalf of his LLC, he is liable to third persons injured thereby.”  Id.   
 
Even in the breach-of-contract setting, the veil of limited liability is not absolute.  Courts “will pierce the veil and assess individual liability where the owners have used the company to promote an injustice or fraud upon the plaintiff.”  Id. at 569.  That can happen in a number of ways.  For example, our Supreme Court has ruled that causing a Company to promise a payment out of an impending loan in order to avoid a mechanic’s lien, which the promisor had no intention of keeping, justified a finding of personal liability.  LaMontagne Builders, Inc. v. Bowman Brook Purchase Group, 150 N.H. 270, 275 (2003).
 
While it is certainly true that “piercing the corporate veil is not permitted solely because a corporation is a one-man operation,” Village Press, Inc. v. Stephen Edward Co., Inc., 120 N.H. 469, 471 (1980), such operations do have a greater risk of rendering their owners personally liable.  Without other shareholders or members to answer to, the temptation to treat the Company as the alter ego of the owner can be quite strong.  Failure to observe corporate formalities and keep corporate and personal assets separate can result in veil piercing.  "A lack of practical separation between the shareholder and the corporation, so that the corporation is merely the shareholder’s ‘alter-ego,’ is an important sign that the shareholder has abused the corporate form.”  Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Matthews, 249 F.Supp.2d 130, 141 (D.N.H. 2003).
 
In addition, every Company must place some capital at risk commensurate with the contracts to be undertaken – and if the Company is too thinly capitalized, it may disable itself from meeting contractual obligations.  This has resulted in veil-piercing in some settings, such as in the development of condominiums:  “Setting up a corporation with insufficient assets or plan for assets to meet its expected debts and obligations under the condominium statute can justify the remedy of piercing the corporate veil.”  Terren v. Butler, 134 N.H. 635, 641 (1991).   In the construction setting there is often a time lag of a month or more between performance and payment, during which time payroll must be met, fuel and supplies must be purchased, etc. – and without a line of credit in some form, contractors can be at risk if they do not invest enough money to meet these interim contractual obligations while waiting for payment on a job.
 
To stay in good standing, a corporation or LLC must pay a modest annual fee and file annual reports with the Secretary of State.  Failure to do so will eventually result in administrative dissolution of the Company.  There is a statutory procedure for reinstatement after administrative dissolution, but any business conducted while the Company is dissolved will likely be deemed to be conducted by the owners personally, thus forfeiting limited liability. 

Even if it otherwise exists, limited liability is lost by signing a personal guaranty.  Most banks and supply houses insist on these as a condition of extending credit to a Company, and most bonding companies insist on them as a condition of issuing payment and/or performance bonds to the Company.  There are good business reasons for those waivers.  Don’t let bad business practices end up forfeiting your protection by operation of law.

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#33:  Conflicting Contract Clauses

9/7/2015

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 Contracts are prepared by human beings, and human beings are imperfect; therefore, contracts are sometimes imperfect too.  One kind of imperfection is a conflict between two different contractual provisions.  It happens more often than you might think.  When it does, the question of which provision governs must be resolved.

Some contracts actually plan for the possibility of a conflict, and include an “order of precedence” clause to resolve conflicts among different documents or classes of documents comprising the contract.  These can be simple, such as Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.236-21 incorporated into government prime contracts (“In the case of difference between drawings and specifications, the specifications shall govern”), or exhaustive, such as the AIA A503 Guide for Supplementary Conditions (2007) suggested model language:

§ 1.2.1.1  In the event of conflicts or discrepancies among the Contract Documents, interpretations will be based on the following priorities:
     1. Modifications.
     2. The Agreement.
     3. Addenda, with those of later date having precedence over those of earlier date.
     4. The Supplementary Conditions.
     5. The General Conditions of the Contract for Construction.
     6. Division 1 of the Specifications.
     7. Drawings and Divisions 2–49 of the Specifications.
     8. Other documents specifically enumerated in the Agreement as part of the Contract
         Documents.


For situations in which the conflict appears within a single document or in documents of the same class, one sometimes sees a provision to the effect that the more burdensome one shall be deemed controlling.  An example is Steele Foundations, Inc. v. Clark Const. Group, Inc., 937 A.2d 148, 155 (D.C. 2007) (“in the event of a conflict between or among the terms of this Subcontract, the higher standard or greater requirement for Subcontractor shall prevail; and in the event of a conflict between or among the terms of the Contract Documents, the higher standard or greater requirement for Subcontractor shall prevail.”).

If there is no tie-breaking language in the contract, the matter can get dicey, particularly given that in New Hampshire (unlike many other states), conflicts and ambiguities in a contract are generally not resolved against the drafter.   Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Salzman, 129 N.H. 692, 696 (1987) (“This court has applied the rule of construction that interprets ambiguous contract language strictly against its writer only in the context of insurance contracts.”).  On the flip side, there is no New Hampshire case law construing an ambiguous provision against a party who failed to request clarification.  The closest we have come is Summit Electric, Inc. v. Pepin Bros. Const., Inc., 121 N.H. 203, 207 (1981), which declined to address a lower court’s suggestion that failure to request clarification at bid time barred a claim for an extra (“We need not discuss, therefore, the correctness of the master’s finding that a general contractor must resolve any contract ambiguities prior to bidding”).

Courts apply various rules of contract construction in an effort to resolve ambiguities.  One common rule of contract interpretation is that if specific and general terms in a contract are in conflict, “a special clause qualifies a general one,” Shelby Mut. Plate Glass & Cas. Co. v. Lynch, 89 N.H. 510, 512 (1938).  See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (1981) (“specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language.”).  Another is that the court will place the same construction on a disputed provision that the parties, by their conduct, appear to have placed.  Auclair v. Bancroft, 121 N.H. 393, 395 (1981) (“In determining the parties’ intention, the court may properly consider their actions after the contract was executed.”).  This can have unintended consequences for a contractor who performs minor work he considers outside his scope without seeking an extra, and then finds that the minor work has mushroomed into major work.

The smart course is for contractors and subcontractors to scrutinize proposed contract language, including notes on plans, as carefully as time will permit before picking up a pen.  If an inconsistency is spotted, seek clarification or modification.  Even in a pre-bid meeting where concerns about educating one’s competitors loom large, speaking up will end up the wisest choice more often than not.

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#32:  The "Independent Duty" Exception to the Economic Loss Rule

8/2/2015

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Several months back I blogged on the Economic Loss Rule―the doctrine that restricts liability in tort for “economic loss” except in cases of a “special relationship” or negligent misrepresentation. Such losses are typically the province of contract law, not tort law.  I noted that the Plourde case made clear that the absence of a contract relationship with the offending party doesn't alter the application of the rule.  A few years later Wyle v. Lees, 162 N.H. 406 (2011), closed the loop, making clear that the presence of a contractual relationship doesn’t matter either.  One cannot sue for economic loss in tort “unless he is owed an independent duty of care outside the terms of the contract,” id. at 410.

The quote from Wyle is, to say the least, curious.  After all, if one is owed a duty “outside the terms of the contract,” then it must be a tort duty―so how can that “independent duty” allow recovery of economic loss if Plourde means what it says, and forbids economic loss recovery other than for negligent misrepresentation?

The obvious answer is, it doesn’t.  And the Wyle case didn’t say otherwise.

The plaintiff in Wyle had purchased an apartment building from the defendants based on a listing agreement which stated that no improvements had been constructed without permits, and based on the contractor’s statement that he had done everything the Town asked him to do.  Both representations turned out to be false.  After correcting numerous code violations and thus incurring an economic loss, the plaintiff sued for negligent misrepresentation.  The defendants argued that the claim was barred by the economic loss rule, thus teeing up a question for the Court:  “While we have recognized an exception to the economic loss doctrine for a negligent misrepresentation claim when the plaintiff and defendant are not parties to a contract, we have never addressed the issue presently before us—whether the economic loss doctrine bars recovery for such a claim between two contracting parties.”  Id. at 410.

The Court ultimately decided in the plaintiff’s favor, noting that his claims “do not merely relate to a breached promise to perform the terms of the contract or attempt to recharacterize a breach of contract claim as a negligent misrepresentation,” but rather “alleged that the defendants' misrepresentations, unrelated to any material terms of the actual purchase and sale agreement, induced him to enter into the agreement.”  Id. at 412.  This “unrelatedness” was key, making the tort duty an “independent” duty.

The bottom line is that economic loss is recoverable in a negligent misrepresentation case despite the presence of a contract if a party’s misrepresentations induced the other party to enter into the contract in the first place.  Schaefer v. Indymac Mortgage Services, 731 F.3d 98, 109 (1st Cir. 2013) (“the negligent misrepresentation exception reaches only those representations that precede the formation of the contract or that relate to a transaction other than the one that constitutes the subject of the contract”).

Negligent misrepresentation, like fraud (i.e., intentional misrepresentation), is by nature an “economic” tort―in the sense that the expected value of something has been diminished as a result of disappointed expectations―so it stands to reason that the rule prohibiting economic loss recovery in a tort case would have an exception for the tort of misrepresentation, whether or not plaintiff and defendant have entered into a contract.  If they do have a contract, the misrepresentation claim must be based on something other than breach of the contractual promise, or else it is exclusively the subject of contract recovery.  In either case, a “benefit of the bargain” or “benefit of the representation” measure of damages is appropriate―in other words, economic loss.  The independent duty requirement assures that a valid tort theory is in play, and not a contract claim under a different guise.


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#31:  Insurance Coverage for the Consequences of Defective Work

7/15/2015

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Defective construction often has a domino effect, as poor workmanship in one area can damage perfectly good work in others.  A steel beam atop a multi-story steel-framed building, if welded improperly, can fall on and damage properly welded beams below.  The law is clear that a standard commercial general liability policy won’t cover the cost of replacing the poorly-welded beam.  But what about the others?

Consider this scenario:  a contractor builds a home, and months later gets a call from the homeowner complaining of water infiltration where the deck meets the house.  The contractor investigates, and finds out that improper flashing is the culprit and will have to be redone.  The adjacent sills were installed correctly, but they are now damaged and need replacing as well.

On reading his insurance policy, he finds the standard exclusion in section (J)(6) for "[t]hat particular part of real property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because 'your work' was incorrectly performed on it."  He asks his lawyer whether the clause excludes coverage for replacing the sills, pointing out that no defective work was “incorrectly performed on” the sills themselves.  His lawyer checks the latest developments in New Hampshire law, and gives him some good news:  the sills should be covered.  Cogswell Farm Condo. Ass'n v. Tower Group, Inc., 167 N.H. 245, 252 (2015), held that “exclusion J(6) bars coverage for property damage to the defectively constructed portions” but “does not bar coverage for damage to those portions of the units that were not defectively constructed . . . but were damaged as a result of the defective work.”

When the insurance carrier receives the contractor’s claim, however, it is unimpressed by the Cogswell Farm ruling, and denies coverage on the ground that there has been no “occurrence” – defined in the policy as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions“ – to trigger coverage in the first place.  It notes that Cogswell Farm declined to consider whether there had been a triggering “occurrence” because the insurance carriers in that case raised the issue too late.  And it points to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Brown v. Concord Group Ins. Co., 163 N.H. 522, 528 (2012), that “to constitute an ‘occurrence,’ the damage at issue must have been to property other than [the contractor's] work product.”  For this purpose, the carrier maintains, the contractor’s “work product” means all of its work, not just the defective work.

Is the carrier right?  A definitive answer must await a case squarely presenting the issue that Brown did not present: whether damage to elements of the construction that were not defective is considered damage to a different work product for purposes of defining “occurrence.”  But contractors have reason to be optimistic.  A popular treatise on insurance law, quoted in Concord General Mutual Ins. Co. v. Green & Co. Bldg. and Development Corp., 160 N.H. 690, 693 (2010), states that “an occurrence is an accident caused by or resulting from faulty workmanship, including damage to any property other than the work product and damage to the work product other than the defective workmanship."  9A S. Plitt, D. Maldonado & J. Rogers, Couch on Insurance 3d § 129:4, at 129-13 to 129-14 (2005) (my emphasis).

Unless all the subsequent dominoes are insured, CGL policies have diminished value.  As the Alabama Supreme Court recently observed in Owners Insurance Co. v. Jim Carr Homebuilder, LLC, 157 So.3d 148, 155 (2014), “to read into the term ‘occurrence’ the limitations urged by [the carrier] would mean that, in a case like this one, where the insured contractor is engaged in constructing an entirely new building, or in a case where the insured contractor is completely renovating a building, coverage for accidents resulting from some generally harmful condition would be illusory.  There would be no portion of the project that, if damaged as a result of exposure to such a condition arising out of faulty workmanship of the insured, would be covered under the policy.”  The court found coverage for the subsequent dominos.  Perhaps our Supreme Court will do likewise.


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#30:  Termination for Cause or Convenience

7/4/2015

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The concept of termination of a contract for breach (usually referred to as “cause”) is as old as contract law.  If one party materially breaches a contract, the other party is excused from further performance and can end the contract without liability.  “Materiality” is the key here.  “Only a breach that is sufficiently material and important to justify ending the whole transaction is a total breach that discharges the injured party's duties.”  Fitz v. Coutinho, 136 N.H. 721, 725 (1993). 

From the contractor’s perspective, a failure to get paid always feels like a “material” breach.  But that is not necessarily the case.  The Fitz case just mentioned held that “[w]hether a delay in payments is a material breach is a question for the trier of fact to determine from the facts and circumstances of the case,” and affirmed a trial court finding that a failure to make the weekly payments prescribed by the parties’ contract did not qualify as “material.”  Conversely, from the owner’s perspective, a contractor’s poor workmanship feels like a “material” breach.  But that is not necessarily the case either.  McNeal v. Lebel, 157 N.H. 458, 465 (2008) (“so long as any flaws in Lebel's performance did not amount to a material breach . . . the plaintiffs were contractually obligated to allow him to finish the job.”).

Because the materiality of a breach is often debatable, contracting parties may prefer to specify in their written agreement the defaults that will justify termination.  For example, the AIA form A201 (2007) General Conditions of the Contract for Construction allows a contractor to suspend work on 7 days notice if not paid within 7 days after payment falls due (§9.7), and terminate the contract if the work remains suspended for an additional 30 days on account of that nonpayment (§14.1.1).  The Owner may terminate the contract if the contractor fails to supply enough workers or materials, fails to pay subs and suppliers, or repeatedly disregards applicable laws or regulations (§14.2.1).

Invoking specified grounds for termination is not without risk: if a court ultimately finds termination not to have been justified, the party who was wrongfully terminated can sue for breach and recover damages.  This risk is greatest for owners, whose grounds for termination are typically less clear-cut than a contractor’s termination for nonpayment.  Owners can lessen this risk by inserting a clause in their contracts that any purported termination for cause, if ultimately proved to be wrongful, shall automatically be deemed to constitute a termination for convenience.  This is a standard provision in government contracts.  See 48 C.F.R. 52.249-8(g) (“If, after termination, it is determined that the Contractor was not in default, or that the default was excusable, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as if the termination had been issued for the convenience of the Government.”)

A termination for convenience clause allows termination of a contract without cause, and specifies the compensation to which the contractor (or subcontractor) will then be entitled.  For example, the AIA form A201 (2007) provides in §14.4.3 that upon termination for the owner’s convenience, “the Contractor shall be entitled to receive payment for Work executed, and costs incurred by reason of such termination, along with reasonable overhead and profit on the Work not executed.”  Some contracts have a less charitable measure of recovery for convenience terminations, limiting the terminated party to payment for work performed and denying any lost profits on work not performed.  In such a case, automatic conversion of a botched termination for cause into a termination for convenience not only insulates the terminating party from breach, but is a real money saver.


When contractors agree with owners (or subcontractors agree with contractors) to such reduced compensation upon termination for convenience, a peculiar and perhaps unintended result is that the owner or contractor can continue to shop the contractor’s or subcontractor’s price throughout the project, and if it finds someone willing to complete the work for less money, it can simply terminate the higher-priced contract and make a change.  Implied obligations of good faith and fair dealing are theoretical restraints against such a practice.  So are transaction costs.  But it can happen.

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#29:  The Economic Loss Rule

5/17/2015

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Tort law―the rules governing liability when one’s negligent or intentional conduct harms another―and contract law―the rules governing liability for broken promises―provide remedies for two different types of damages.  In general, tort law compensates victims for personal injury and property damage, while contract law compensates for loss of the benefit of a bargain―a commercial or “economic” loss.  Under tort law, “persons must refrain from causing personal injury and property damage to third parties, but no corresponding tort duty exists with respect to economic loss.”  Ellis v. Robert C. Morris, Inc., 128 N.H. 358, 364 (1986).  Under contract law, the economic loss rule “preclude[s] contracting parties from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses associated with the contract relationship,” Plourde Sand & Gravel Co. v. JGI Eastern, Inc., 154 N.H. 791, 794 (2007).

Notice that the statement I just quoted from the Plourde case follows automatically from the rule announced in Ellis, which would preclude everyone, not just contracting parties, from pursuing tort recovery for purely economic or commercial losses, whether associated with a contractual relationship or not.  Plourde itself made clear that the lack of a contract relationship with the offending party doesn't change this.  The plaintiff, a gravel supplier on a road project, was required by the site work subcontractor to replace gravel that the Town engineer’s testing company claimed was off-spec.  The plaintiff sued the testing company for negligence in testing the material, thereby costing the plaintiff needless expense―an economic loss.  It argued unsuccessfully that the Court should “decline to apply the economic loss rule because the plaintiff is not in privity with the defendant and therefore cannot recover its economic loss in an action for breach of contract.  We have never applied this principle before and decline to do so here.”  Id. at 795.

The message seems to be that you can only recover economic losses from parties you have a contract with (or, in legalese, are “in privity” with).  The economic loss rule, however, is not quite so ironclad.  New Hampshire recognizes two exceptions, also discussed in Plourde: (1) where there is a “special relationship” between the parties giving rise to a duty of care despite the absence of a contract between them; and (2) where there was a negligent misrepresentation relied upon by the plaintiff.

The “special relationship” exception, sometimes referred to as the "professional negligence" exception, applies when the negligent party has contracted with a third party to provide services that he knows are intended to benefit or influence the plaintiff.  (Example: insurance investigators “owe a duty to the insured as well as to the insurer” to perform their services properly; Morvay v. Hanover Ins. Cos., 127 N.H. 723, 726 (1986)).

The negligent misrepresentation exception applies where “the defendant has some special reason to anticipate the reliance of the plaintiff” on the defendant’s statements.  Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 903 (1982) (imposing tort liability on an accounting firm for economic loss suffered by a third party creditor who relied upon unaudited financial statements prepared by the firm).

In the construction setting, a contractor’s or subcontractor’s reliance on a design professional’s negligent drawings, specifications, opinions or instructions could allow recovery of economic losses under either one of these exceptions.  But don’t count on it.  Neither exception helped the plaintiff in Plourde, even though the defendant testing company must have known that its test results would be relied upon by everyone down the chain and ultimately require the plaintiff to replace its gravel.  Until our Supreme Court weighs in on particular fact patterns, the best an attorney can do here is make an educated guess.

The bottom line is that the economic loss rule is actually two rules.  If you don’t have a contract with the negligent party, recovery of economic losses flowing from that negligence requires proof of a “special relationship” or of negligent misrepresentation―an uphill battle.  And if you do have a contract with the offending party, you cannot look beyond your contract to tort law for recovery of economic loss unless that party breached a duty to you independent of the contractual promises.  What constitutes an "independent" duty here will be the subject of a future blog.


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#28:  Excusing the Failure to Meet a Performance Spec

4/26/2015

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A few months back I blogged about design and performance specs, and noted that difficulties in meeting a performance spec can be excused when implementing it is impossible or commercially impracticable (i.e., impossible to achieve or achievable only at excessive cost).  In such a case, the contract documents call for a result that cannot reasonably be expected of the contractor under the parameters given.

The problem can arise whenever the designing engineer fails to appreciate how his specs are interrelated, and calls for two things that are in tension with each other.  To take a simple example, if a given design for a turf field requires permeability of X inches per hour (a performance spec) but also requires the underlying base stone to contain a high minimum percentage of small particles (a design spec), the net result will be that the air voids needed for good drainage will be filled with too many fines to achieve the required permeability.

Many contracts require the contractor to call to the architect’s or engineer’s attention any inconsistencies of this sort that the contractor happens to notice.  Unless the tension is glaring, however, a contractor will typically not spot the problem at bid time.  Even if subcontractor bids have been solicited for portions of the overall specs in advance of the contractor’s own bid, chances are they will not have been solicited very far in advance, and the most experienced specialty subcontractor could fail to notice a latent problem―particularly where other specs imposing some physical constraints on the options available to implement a given performance requirement happen to be buried in another spec section.

Some courts hold that the constraints imposed by those other specs can excuse a performance spec simply by unduly restraining the contractor’s choice of means and methods to achieve it.  That was the case, for instance, in Niagara County v. R & D Engineering, P.C., 298 A.D.2d 971, 973 (2002), a suit by a Water District against Goulds Pumps for furnishing pumps with “excessive vibration” beyond the maximum levels required in the specs.  Because the contract documents included “at least seven pages of the ‘details of construction’ for the pumps and their motors,” the Court found that “the vibration specification was not a performance specification, inasmuch as it cannot be said that Goulds was ‘free to choose the materials, methods and design necessary to meet the objective or standard of performance.’"

Other courts hold that “when a contract contains a mix of both design and performance specifications, the contractor may defend on an implied warranty theory if the design specifications are defective to the degree that adherence to them results in an article that fails to satisfy a stated performance specification."  R.J. Crowley, Inc. v. U.S., 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS. 21618 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

Still other courts hold that meeting a performance spec is excused if meeting related design specs renders the performance spec commercially impracticable.   An example is Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Engineers, Inc. Clark Dietz Div., 775 F.2d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We conclude that Ashbrook's inability to supply a filter press that would both satisfy Dietz's mechanical specifications and perform as required is sufficient to establish that performance of its contract with Waldinger was commercially impracticable.”).

Whichever of these approaches is taken, the basic concept is the same.  If design specs foreclose a contractor’s options to the point that meeting a performance spec becomes impossible or impracticable, failure to meet the performance spec will be excused. 

The risk to the contractor is that commercial impracticability, like beauty, is in the eye if the beholder.  A contract is commercially impracticable when performance would cause "extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss to one of the parties." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 cmt. d (1981).  One judge or jury may have a different view than another of what is “extreme and unreasonable.”


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#27:  Contractor Liability for Dangerous Products

3/8/2015

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Recently 60 Minutes aired an exposé on Lumber Liquidators’ sales of Chinese-made laminate flooring containing elevated levels of formaldehyde, a known carcinogen.  Class action lawsuits against Lumber Liquidators in California and Florida quickly followed, alleging that the company knew or should have known that its laminate flooring products were mislabeled, improperly tested and unsafe.

The safety of a product purchased by a contractor is typically not something that the contractor worries about.  If the product is sold on the open market, the contractor presumes it to be safe, essentially relying on the seller to make sure that it is.  But to the homeowner, the contractor is the seller – and the homeowner usually indulges the exact same presumption.  If a contractor buys and installs a dangerous product, is he liable to his customer for any resulting injury?  The answer is far from clear.

In the context of a “transaction in goods,” the Uniform Commercial Code provides that all products sold by “a merchant with respect to goods of that kind” carry an implied warranty of “merchantability” promising, among other things, that the goods “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”  Dangerous products – at least those whose danger is not apparent -- typically are not considered fit for their ordinary purposes in the absence of a warning.  Unless this implied warranty has been disclaimed by agreement of the parties (a rare event in the typical residential construction project) the contractor may be at risk―but only if he is both engaging in a “transaction in goods” and is a “merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”

Whether a contractor building a project is engaged in a sale of goods for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code, or is simply furnishing a service, depends on which of two tests is applied: the “predominant factor” test, which asks “whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved,” or the “gravamen of the action” test, which asks “whether the underlying action is brought because of alleged defective goods or because of the quality of the service rendered.”   In re Trailer and Plumbing Supplies, 133 N.H. 432, 436 (1990).  While the “predominant factor” test was applied in that particular case (no claim of defective goods was made), the “gravamen of the action” test could well be applicable where defective installation is not at issue and the claim centers on a defect in the product itself―with the result that the contractor is more likely to be deemed a seller of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code.  The answer must await a test case.

But is the contractor also a merchant who “deals in goods of the kind?”  A singular sale of the offending product, standing alone, is not sufficient; such sales must be frequent enough to justify the conclusion that the contractor “deals” in them.  The more such sales it makes, the more likely the contractor is to pass this second test as well.

Apart from the Uniform Commercial Code, ordinary tort law sometimes renders a seller strictly liable for “unreasonably” dangerous products, i.e., where “the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product,” Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Industries, Inc., 147 N.H. 150, 154 (2001).  Fortunately for contractors, our Supreme Court has rejected strict liability for contractors, at least as to the structure as a whole:  “Although a building contractor supplies a structure to the owner, ‘[t]he generally accepted view has not been to impose strict liability, either on a warranty or tort theory, to the building contractor who is regarded as being engaged primarily in the rendition of a service, i.e., the construction of a building on land owned by another pursuant to plans and specifications provided by the owner.’”  Bruzga v. PMR Architects, P.C., 141 N.H. 756, 762 (1997).  Whether the case will immunize contractors from liability for a particular defective component of a structure remains to be seen, but this language certainly bodes well for contractors.  And the Court’s mention of a “warranty” theory within the scope of the general rule of nonliability may have promising implications for claims under the Uniform Commercial Code as well.


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#26:  Indemnity Obligations

2/13/2015

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Indemnity is the obligation of one party (the “indemnitor”) to protect another party (the “indemnitee”) from claims and damages asserted by third parties.  It can be either express (written into a contract) or implied (imposed by law as a matter of policy when a party who is free from fault is nevertheless held vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of another). 

Express indemnity provisions are common in construction contracts, particularly for tort claims. An example is Section 3.18.1 of the AIA form A201 (2007) General Conditions of the Contract for Construction: “[t]he Contractor shall indemnify and hold harmless the Owner . . . from and against claims, damages, losses and expenses . . . arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work, provided that such claim, damage, loss or expense is attributable to bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or to injury to or destruction of tangible property (other than the Work itself), but only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the Contractor, a subcontractor, or anyone directly or indirectly employed by or anyone for whose acts they may be liable.”

Providing indemnity “only to the extent caused by the negligent acts or omissions of the Contractor” or those for whom it is vicariously liable is an important limitation, making indemnity obligations proportionate to fault.  If, for example, an Owner’s negligence was the partial or sole cause of a third party’s damages, this language would require Owner and Contractor to bear the liability in proportion to the negligence (if any) ascribed to each.  But like any other clause in a form contract, this limitation is sometimes sought to be eliminated by the contracting parties.  I have seen a number of construction contracts that require one party to indemnify another even from the consequences of the indemnitee’s own negligence.  Such provisions were once enforceable in New Hampshire, at least where the parties had insurance to cover their indemnity obligations.  Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Brown Co., 120 N.H. 620, 625 (1980), explained:

“Contracts which provide for indemnification of a party against his own future acts of negligence are generally not prohibited.  See 41 Am.Jur.2d Indemnity § 9 (1968).  This is especially true in the construction industry.  See 27 A.L.R.3d 663 § 2 (1969).  The courts have recognized that ‘Ordinarily the financial responsibility for the risk of injury during the course of a construction project is shifted in any event by the primary parties to their insurance carriers and the parties ought therefore to be free to determine how the insurance burdens will be distributed between them and who will pay for specific coverage for specific risks.  The impact of the indemnity agreement between owner and contractor and contractor and subcontractor is therefore, in practical effect, the parties’ allocation between themselves of the total required insurance protection for the project.’  Doloughty v. Blanchard Const. Co., 139 N.J.Super. 110, 116, 352 A.2d 613, 616 (1976).  The purpose of the indemnity agreement in the case before us was to allocate the insurance burdens of the parties; we do not see such an allocation as contravening public policy.”

In 2004 the New Hampshire Legislature changed this rule.  RSA 338-A:2 now provides: “Any provision for or in connection with a contract for construction, reconstruction, installation, alteration, remodeling, repair, demolition, or maintenance work, including without limitation, excavation, backfilling or grading, on any building or structure, whether underground or above ground, or on any real property, including without limitation any road, bridge, tunnel, sewer, water, or other utility line, which requires any party to indemnify any person or entity for injury to persons or damage to property not caused by the party or its employees, agents, or subcontractors, shall be void.”


After this statutory change, indemnification for personal injury and property damage claims (precisely the claims typically covered by a Commercial General Liability policy) now tracks fault regardless of whether the indemnitor's liability can be sloughed off to an insurance carrier.  But the statute does not address broader indemnity clauses which purport to shift liability for all claims, whether or not related to personal injury or property damage.




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#25:  Building Codes: The Baseline for Proper Construction

1/25/2015

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Since 2000, the International Code Council has published a version of its International Building Code every three years, setting forth the minimum requirements for design and construction of buildings within its scope.  (A separate International Residential Code governs the construction of one- and two-family dwellings.)  The Council also puts out an International Mechanical Code, International Plumbing Code and International Energy Conservation Code on the same three year cycle.

Currently New Hampshire has adopted the 2009 versions of these documents as its State Building Code (along with the 2014 version of the National Electrical Code).  Municipalities are free to adopt stricter standards than contained in these codes, but few municipalities do so.  Enforcement of the State Building Code is the responsibility of the municipalities; if they don’t have code enforcement officials, the State Fire Marshall steps in to fill that role.

RSA 155-A:2,VII is explicit that “The contractor of a building, building component, or structure shall be responsible for meeting the minimum requirements of the state building code and state fire code.”  But responsible to whom?  Certainly to the municipality for any fines assessed (RSA 155-A:8 and 676:17 authorize fines of $275 for the first offense and $550 for subsequent offenses, for each day that a violation continues after notice of noncompliance).  Likely to the owner, who will have a hard time getting a certificate of occupancy without a code-compliant structure.  But what about liability to third parties for physical injury or financial harm arising from the structure being out of code?

Our Supreme Court has yet to rely on this statute as a basis for contractor liability to an injured plaintiff, for the simple reason that no plaintiff has yet pressed the issue.  But the Court has noted in other contexts that violation of a statute or regulation can amount to negligence when the defendant already owes a common law duty of care to the plaintiff.  In such a case the defendant “will be held to the statutory standard of conduct if the plaintiff is in a class the legislature intended to protect, and the harm is of a type the legislature intended to prevent."  Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 714 (1995).  In the case of building codes, the harm intended to be prevented is physical injury from an unsafe structure.  If, indeed, a contractor owes a common law duty to potential occupants of a building to make it safe―and despite occasional hints, the Supreme Court has never explicitly declared that such a common law duty exists―the State Building Code would likely set the threshold standard of care, in which case its breach would automatically amount to negligence.

As to financial harm, it’s pretty clear that RSA 155-A:2,VII imposes no liability on the contractor, nor does it establish the standard of care for a common law duty owed by the contractor to the owner.  Building codes are intended “to protect the health and secure the safety of occupants of buildings, and not to protect the personal or property interests of individuals,” Island Shores Estates Condominium Ass'n v. City of Concord, 136 N.H. 300, 307 (1992).  An owner who wants the latter protection must get it from his contract, not from the statute.  (This is a variant of the “economic loss rule” that precludes recovery of purely financial harm in a tort case.  I’ll have more to say about the “economic loss rule” in a future blog.)

RSA 155-A:2,VII also states that “No municipality shall be held liable for any failure on the part of a contractor to comply with the provisions of the state building code.”   This language settles a question left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Island Shores Estates.  The case rejected an owner’s claim of financial harm against a municipality based on a building inspector’s issuance of a certificate of occupancy in the face of code and structural problems, because no duty was owed by the city to protect the owner’s financial interests.  However, the Court declined to decide “whether recovery can be had for a physical injury sustained on the premises in reliance on the inspection.”  The statute now answers that question in the negative.

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#24:  Design Specs and Performance Specs

1/4/2015

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When a contractor bids on a set of construction specifications, he looks beyond what specific materials, configurations and connections are called for, and considers the means and methods his crew will employ to build the project.  Rarely are those means and methods dictated to him in the specs.  On those rare occasions when the specs dictate not only the “what” but also the “how,” deviations from the “how” specs are not allowed.  These are often called “design specs.”

Sometimes the desired end result of the construction is not only to “be” something (like a bridge or a residence), but also to “do” something―to perform in a specified manner (like a “clean room” or waste water treatment plant).  These are often called “performance specs.”

Courts have picked up this verbiage.  To quote from Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1987), “Design specifications explicitly state how the contract is to be performed and permit no deviations.  Performance specifications, on the other hand, specify the results to be obtained, and leave it to the contractor to determine how to achieve those results.”  This makes it sound as though a set of specs must be one or the other.  The truth is that a given set of specs will often have elements of both.

The distinction is important when it comes to assigning blame for a project that doesn’t work out as planned.  If the contractor implements the precise design he is given, then regardless of how he implemented it and regardless of whether the owner or the contractor dictated the means of implementing it, the contractor is off the hook.  This is the so-called Spearin doctrine, named for the case of United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 (1918) (“But if the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequence of defects in the plans and specifications”).

Not only does the contractor have no liability when he implements the specs he is given, but he is entitled to be paid for his work
―even if the outcome is unsatisfactory.  This is the teaching of Perkins v. Roberge, 69 N.H. 171, 173 (1897), in which a contractor “agreed in writing with the defendant to build a baker's oven and furnace in a workmanlike manner, in accordance with a plan and specifications furnished by the defendant.  The oven was built by the plaintiff in accordance with the contract.  It did not work in a satisfactory manner on account of the fault of the plans.  The failure of the oven to work in a satisfactory manner being attributable to the defects in the plans furnished by the defendant, and not to the failure of the plaintiff to perform his contract, he is entitled to recover the contract price for the performance of his undertaking.”

The Spearin doctrine and the rule enunciated in Perkins apply to design specs, not to performance specs.  Consequently, contractors often find themselves arguing that a relevant spec is design and not performance based.  If, as some courts hold, design specs are those which eliminate contractor discretion as to the means and methods of implementation, the argument is a hard one to win.  In my view, such a focus on discretion is overblown.  The first question should always be whether the fault lies in the plans and specs themselves, or in how they were implemented ―and only in the latter case should we ask whether the means and methods of implementation were dictated or chosen.

Losing this argument is not always the end of the game for a contractor.  As Smith, Currie and Hancock’s Common Sense Construction Law (5th ed. 2014) notes, “an owner still can be liable for a contractor’s unanticipated difficulties under a performance specification if the contractor shows that the owner-furnished performance specification was impossible or commercially impracticable to achieve.  A performance specification is commercially impracticable if it can be performed only at an excessive and unreasonable cost.”  I’ll be blogging on this at a later date.


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