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#80: Transitioning to the New Building Codes

8/11/2019

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Effective September 15, 2019, New Hampshire’s building codes – specifically the International Building Code, International Residential Code, International Plumbing Code, International Mechanical Code, International Existing Building Code and International Energy Conservation Code – will upgrade from their current 2009 versions to the 2015 versions published by the International Code Council.  The ICC updates its proposed codes every three years (there is already a 2018 version published), and New Hampshire is finally catching up to other New England states.

There are bound to be some fits and starts in implementing the transition – a subject the legislation adopting the 2015 codes did not address, and which is therefore left to the municipalities to deal with.  As of this writing, very few towns and cities have posted any guidance on how they will handle plans and applications already submitted to building code officials for approval under the 2009 versions.

It seems clear that approvals received prior to September 15, 2019 for plans and applications submitted under the old code will be honored without requiring revisions to implement new code changes, even for construction completed and building inspections conducted after that date – at least if the project is completed within a reasonable time thereafter.  Section 107.3.2 of the 2015 International Building Code and Section 106.3.2 of the 2015 International Residential Code both provide that “This code shall not require changes in the construction documents, construction or designated occupancy of a structure for which a lawful permit has been heretofore issued or otherwise lawfully authorized, and the construction of which has been pursued in good faith within 180 days after the effective date of this code and has not been abandoned.”  (The Town of Amherst has tweaked this by imposing a completion deadline of 180 days after September 15 for projects seeking to avail themselves of this safe harbor.)  
 
The thornier question is what to do about plans and applications in the pipeline that have not yet been approved by September 15 and are premised on the old code.  Don’t expect consistency here.  Some municipalities will take a hard line and insist on compliance with the 2015 codes.  (The Town of Chester, for example, has announced that “Any plans or applications submitted on or after September 1, 2019 must be designed to meet these codes.  Any project slated to begin after September 1, 2019 must also meet the new codes, regardless of application submittal date.”)  Others will continue to apply 2009 codes to pre-September 15 applications.  (The City of Nashua, for example, advises that projects “which have submitted an application for review prior to September 15, 2019 will be permitted to continue finalizing designs, receive permitting and have inspections performed to the applicable codes in effect at time of application, provided that final ‘For Construction’ building and building systems plans are submitted no later than December 15, 2019.”)
 
Pragmatically, a court challenge is more likely to be mounted against a strict approach (builders fully invested in a project designed to the 2009 codes may not be willing to eat significant redesign costs lying down) than against a lenient approach (someone injured due to a condition permitted by the 2009 code but forbidden by the 2015 code will likely see their lawsuit falter on a “discretionary function immunity” defense).  I suspect that many towns will favor the Nashua approach over the Chester approach for that reason. 
 
But don’t count on it.  If you will be applying for a building permit between now and September 15 in a town that has no published guidance on this issue, make a phone call and ask.  If you don’t get a straight answer – and maybe even if you do get a straight answer (local code enforcement officials’ off-the-cuff guesses, fueled by their desire for more time to study up on the changes, can get overruled later, spawning the kind of “municipal estoppel” lawsuits that make construction lawyers wince) – the wiser course may be to submit plans that comply with the updated code, even if it means having your architect troubleshoot and revise your design.
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#79:  Res Judicata and the Privity Element

7/21/2019

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How many bites at the apple is a litigant given to prove his claim?  Generally, only one.  This principle finds expression in a legal doctrine called res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, which “prevents parties from relitigating matters actually litigated and matters that could have been litigated in the first action.”  Merriam Farm, Inc. v. Town of Surry, 168 N.H. 197, 199 (2015). “[I]t applies if three elements are met: (1) the parties are the same or in privity with one another; (2) the same cause of action was before the court in both instances; and (3) the first action ended with a final judgment on the merits.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  The doctrine applies not only to court cases but to arbitrations.  Finn v. Ballentine Partners, LLC, 169 N.H. 128 (2016).
 
In this context “privity with one another” is shorthand for a substantive legal relationship between a party to the prior action and a non-party, one which makes it fair to conclude that “the interests of the non-party were in fact represented and protected in the prior litigation,” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 779 (2003), such as “when a person controls or substantially participates in controlling the presentation or if a non-party authorizes a party in litigation to represent his or her interests,” id.   Representation of interests is to be distinguished from commonality of interests.  As noted in New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n v. Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326, 328 (1st Cir. 1995), “normally something more is required for privity between the prior and present litigants than merely a common interest in the outcome.”
 
Is the relationship between a general contractor and its subcontractors enough to establish the necessary privity?  If we analogize the contractor–subcontractor relationship to the employer–employee relationship, the answer would seem to be No.  In Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 129 N.H. 561, 573 (1987), the Court “reject[ed] privity by employment for the basic reason that an employer representing himself does not necessarily defend the interest of the employee whose behavior has become the occasion for legal action. There is, rather, a potential for conflict between their respective interests, and this case illustrates it well: the employer’s option to defend by claiming that its employee acted outside the scope of his employment is an option to defend the employer by sacrificing the employee.”  The same is true when a GC defends against an owner’s tort claims on grounds that its subcontractor is an independent contractor for whose negligence the GC bears no responsibility.
 
It follows that a subcontractor is not automatically stuck with the outcome when the GC botches the claim – unless he had a duty to intervene in the case to assert his own rights, or authorized the GC to spearhead his claims (see Blog #55: Pass Through Claims).  But he may still stick the owner with the outcome if the GC won the prior case.  Say an owner litigates claims and counterclaims with his general contractor, and then sues the subcontractors for the same alleged sins.  The subs should be able to invoke res judicata even though they were not parties to the first lawsuit.  This result is suggested by Fiumara v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies, 746 F.2d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 1984), where an insured litigated a case against his insurers in state court, and later sued the insurer’s investigators and testing laboratory in federal court:
 
“While these appellees were not parties to the state suit, the application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, both in the federal courts and in New Hampshire, is no longer grounded upon mechanical requirements of mutuality.  Instead, the significant question is whether a party has had a full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue.  That opportunity was palpably present in the state court proceedings. And, given the allegations of the federal complaint that [appellees] were each and all acting as agents of the insurers when they committed the putative misdeeds for which they have now been sued, they clearly qualify as persons in privity with FFIC and DMFIC.  Thus, the res judicata defense is unmistakably available to them.”
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#78:  Substantial Completion: Whence It Came, Why It Matters

6/22/2019

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In the law of contracts, any failure to perform any promised duty is a breach.  Historically, whether a breach justified a complete refusal to pay the breaching party for goods or services furnished depended on whether the nonbreaching party received or refused the benefits of partial performance.  If he accepted them, he was obliged to pay for them; but if he opted to refuse them, he need not pay any of the agreed contract price.  This was dubbed the “perfect tender” rule: if a contract is made to do X for an agreed price, and X isn’t perfectly done, the nonbreaching party could refuse to pay any part of the price.

The first case to alter this rule was Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).  Britton had agreed to work for Turner for a full year, at the end of which Turner had agreed to pay him $120.  Britton quit after ten months and Turner refused to pay him a cent.  The court held that Turner must pay the fair value of Britton’s services (minus any damages from his failure to perform completely). Justice demanded that the divisible nature of the contract’s day-to-day performance precluded Turner’s rejection of their benefits, which were automatically deemed accepted.

Britton v. Turner limited its holding to “divisible” contracts (benefits accrue as performance is rendered) as opposed to “entire” contracts (benefits accrue only upon completion), and appeared to place construction contracts in the latter category: “[W]here the party has contracted to furnish materials, and do certain labor, as to build a house in a specified manner, if it is not done according to the contract, the party for whom it is built may refuse to receive it--elect to take no benefit from what has been performed.”  Eventually the courts abandoned this fallacy, and began treating construction contracts the same as labor contracts.  Danforth v. Freeman, 69 N.H. 466, 468 (1899) (“in special contracts for labor day by day, or for labor and materials in erecting a building upon the land of another, the person for whom the work is done necessarily receives the value of the work done as it is done, and if any advantage has accrued to him therefrom, is liable to pay for the benefit received,--the worth to him of the partial performance of the contract by the other party.”).

This has now morphed into the doctrine of “substantial performance,” which is “intended to protect the right to compensation of those who have performed in all material and substantive particulars, so that their right to compensation may not be forfeited by reason of mere technical, inadvertent, or unimportant omissions or defects.”  15 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 44:52, at 220-21 (4th ed. 2000).  The nonbreaching party is entitled to offset any costs of completion or correction – but he may not reject the performance and refuse to pay anything just because the finished product was not delivered 100% to his specifications.  Today the right of rejection due to lack of perfect tender is restricted to contracts for the sale of goods.

In the construction context “substantial performance” is equivalent to “substantial completion.”  Contracts will often define the phrase (the stage of construction at which the owner may use the work for its intended purposes being a particularly popular definition), and many contracts use it as a trigger for various things ranging from the initial release of retainage, to the cessation of liquidated damages, to the beginning of the warranty period.  It also starts the commencement of the eight-year statute of repose under RSA 508:4-b.  And most importantly, it renders the contractor’s breaches insufficiently material to justify terminating his contract.  As one leading commentator put it, “Substantial performance is performance without a material breach, and a material breach results in performance that is not substantial.”  E. Allen Farnsworth, Contracts § 8.12 (4th ed. 2004).  Upon achieving substantial completion, an unpaid contractor may sue for breach of contract and recover damages measured by the agreed contract price less any costs of completing or correcting the work (i.e., punch list items).
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#77:  Mechanic's Lien vs. Mortgage: A Quirk in the Priority Scheme

5/26/2019

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A few years back I blogged (#42) on priorities as between mechanic’s liens and earlier-filed construction mortgages (the mechanic’s lien wins, subject to a couple of exceptions), and as between mechanic’s liens and earlier-filed conventional mortgages (the conventional mortgage wins).  This priority scheme raises the possibility that the priorities may not be transitive: A could trump B, B could trump C and C could trump A if a construction mortgage is recorded first, a conventional mortgage is recorded second and a mechanic’s lien is recorded third.  In such a case, what will be the pecking order after a foreclosure?

Recently the New Hampshire Supreme Court rendered an opinion on a somewhat analogous fact pattern that may shed light on our question.  In Sabato v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 172 N.H. 128 (2019), the plaintiff’s wife gave two mortgages on her home to two different mortgagees, but the plaintiff waived his $120,000 homestead exemption – which trumps a mortgage if not waived, see RSA 480:5-a – only as to the second mortgage.  When the second mortgagee foreclosed and bought the property at auction for $64,872 subject to the first mortgage, the question arose whether the homestead exemption had been extinguished by the foreclosure even as to the first mortgage.  “The plaintiff contended that foreclosure of the second mortgage did not affect his homestead right because he had not waived that right in the first mortgage.  FNMA argued that, because the plaintiff waived his homestead interest in the second mortgage, he could not now assert any homestead right.”  Id. at 130.

Both positions were rejected.  Noting that “upon foreclosure, the plaintiff’s homestead right had priority over the first mortgage,” the Court ruled “the waiver gave [the] second mortgage priority over the first mortgage up to the value of the plaintiff’s homestead right ($120,000),” meaning that when it “foreclosed its second mortgage, it stepped into first position up to a maximum of $120,000 because it, unlike the first mortgagee, had access to the value of the homestead right, and that right, as previously noted, had priority over the first mortgage.”  Id. at 133.  Since the $64,872 bid at the foreclosure sale was the second mortgage balance, there was no surplus to deal with, but the Court nevertheless said this: “Had the property sold for more than the indebtedness under the second mortgage note, the surplus proceeds up to the remaining balance of the plaintiff’s homestead exemption would have been exempt from the first mortgage and payable to the plaintiff before FNMA, as holder of the first mortgage, received any proceeds.”  Id. at 134.

The Court then addressed the extent to which the homestead exemption had been extinguished by the foreclosure, ruling that “any portion of the exemption left after satisfying the second mortgage, which continues to exist in either the surplus [citation omitted] or, we now hold, in the property, is not subordinate to the mortgage and is not extinguished by the foreclosure. . . The waiver of the plaintiff’s homestead exemption in the second mortgage did not impute a waiver into the first mortgage; rather, the waiver in the second mortgage merely gave the second mortgagee the right to step into the plaintiff’s shoes with respect to his priority over the first mortgage up to the value of the homestead exemption . . . The plaintiff, having waived his homestead right in the second mortgage, has no grounds to complain that the second mortgagee has availed itself of the homestead to satisfy its mortgage and left him unable to assert his entire homestead exemption against the first mortgagee.”  Id. at 135.

The analogy between a homestead exemption and a mechanic’s lien is not perfect, but Sabato suggests that a mechanic’s lien with priority over a first mortgage but not over a foreclosing second mortgage will be extinguished by the second mortgagee’s foreclosure only to the extent necessary to satisfy the second mortgage balance.  A sales price at foreclosure above that amount will likely be deemed to create a fund on which the mechanic’s lienor has first dibs.  To be safe, the lienor may need to bid at auction a price sufficient to cover not only the second mortgage balance but the lien amount as well.
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#76:  Indemnity and the Statute of Repose

4/24/2019

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New Hampshire’s statute of repose for construction claims, RSA 508:4-b, puts a time limit of eight years from the date of substantial completion on the filing of most lawsuits challenging construction and design deficiencies in the creation of an improvement to real property, after which time no suit can be brought regardless of whether the claim was latent and not discoverable for most or all of that period.  In this respect it is unlike the statute of limitations, RSA 508:4, whose three-year clock does not start ticking until the claim “accrues” -- which may be more than three years after the breach of duty occurs if the breach and resulting injury were neither discovered nor reasonably discoverable until later.
 
The statute of limitations operates differently with respect to indemnity claims, which “do not accrue for the purposes of the statute of limitations until a judgment has been paid by the third-party plaintiff” because the “statute of limitations cannot possibly start to run on an indemnity claim until the party seeking indemnification suffers a loss.”  Jaswell Drilling Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 129 N.H. 341, 347 (1987).  Often a suit brought within that three year limitations period will result in a judgment beyond it, yet still allow the loser’s indemnification suit against the indemnitor to proceed even though filed well more than three years after the underlying claim accrued.  But what if the party seeking indemnification suffers that judgment, that “loss,” more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement giving rise to the underlying claim?  Does the statute of repose shut out his right to indemnity?
 
A recent decision from New Hampshire’s federal district court says it does.  In Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Superior Fire Protection, Inc., Civil No. 18-cv-117-JL, 2019 WL 1318274 (D.N.H. March 22, 2019), the inspector/tester of a sprinkler system was sued by the subrogee of the hotel where the system had failed, and in turn sought indemnity or contribution from the installer of the system.  The installer, having substantially completed its work more than eight years prior to the lawsuit, sought refuge under the statute of repose.  The inspector/tester countered that its claim for indemnity did not accrue until it was sued by the subrogee.  But “accrual” is not the trigger under the statute of repose, said Judge LaPlante.  Rather, substantial completion is the trigger, barring indemnity and contribution claims “even if those claims would — as they would here — accrue after the repose period has run.”  The Court granted the installer’s motion for summary judgment.
 
What is somewhat unusual about this case is the fact that the underlying action by the subrogee against the inspector/tester was not itself barred by the statute of repose (because the allegedly deficient inspection/testing of the sprinkler system was not a  “deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property,” and in any event occurred years after that improvement was substantially complete).  In most construction settings the would-be indemnitee, if sued within eight years of substantial completion of the improvement at issue, will still be timely in seeking indemnity from an indemnitor -- as long as he doesn’t wait to suffer a judgment first.  And he doesn’t need to wait.  As Judge McNamara noted in Penta Corporation v. Town of Newport, No. 212-2015-CV-00011, 2015 WL 11182532 (Merrimack Super. Ct., Nov. 20, 2015), “While technically the right to indemnity arises when a judgment is rendered in favor of another, it has long been the practice to try indemnity claims, when properly pled, along with an underlying action.”  Indemnity claimants would be well served to file their cross-claims against potential indemnitors in the underlying action, before the eight-year repose clock winds down.
 
Quaere: Continental Western concerned a claim of derivative or equitable indemnity, not one of express contractual indemnity.  If there had been such a contractual right to indemnity, would a claim for breach of that contract still have been barred by the statute?
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#75:  Recovery for Defective Work After Termination for Convenience

3/13/2019

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Many contracts specify that an owner may terminate a contractor, and many subcontracts specify that a contractor may terminate a subcontractor, either for cause (i.e., for breach) or for “convenience” (i.e., without breach).  Generally there are different remedies associated with each type of termination, with convenience terminations providing for more favorable benefits to the terminated party.  And there could be one unintended benefit: protection against backcharges for defective work.
 
Shelter Products, Inc. v. Steelwood Construction, Inc., 257 Or.App. 382, 307 P.3d 449 (2013), explains the logic.  A general contractor (Catamount) terminated one of its subcontractors (Steelwood) under a clause in their subcontract that read “The Contractor may, upon seven (7) days written notice to the Subcontractor, without cause and without prejudice to any other right or remedy, terminate this Subcontract, in whole or in part, for its convenience . . . The obligations of the Subcontractor shall continue as to portions of the work already performed and as to bona fide obligations assumed by Subcontractor prior to the date of termination. Subcontractor shall be entitled to be paid the full cost of all work properly done by Subcontractor to the date of termination not previously paid for, less sums already received by Subcontractor on account of the portion of the work performed.”
 
When Catamount refused to pay Steelwood’s last materials invoice, Steelwood sued -- and Catamount counterclaimed for alleged defective work.  The trial court disallowed the setoff, and the appeals court agreed, ruling that “the text of the termination for convenience clause, in context, does not under the circumstances of this case permit Catamount to both terminate Steelwood without cause and subsequently proceed against Steelwood as if it had terminated the agreement for cause. . . [W]e are persuaded, at least in the absence of an opportunity to correct allegedly defective work, that, where a party has terminated a contract for convenience, that party may not then counterclaim for the cost of curing any alleged default.”
 
Depriving a terminated contractor of an opportunity to cure defects was likewise the basis for rejecting defective workmanship claims in TRG Construction, Inc. v. Water & Sewer Authority, 70 A.3d 1164, 1167-68 (D.C. 2013) (“Upon terminating a contract for convenience, the government loses whatever right it has to hold the contractor responsible for correcting deficiencies in the work included in the terminated portion of the contract”), and in Paragon Restoration Group, Inc. v. Cambridge Square Condominiums, 42 A.D.3d 905, 839 N.Y.S.2d 658 (2007)  (“[w]here [defendant] elects to terminate for convenience . . ., whether with or without cause, it cannot counterclaim for the cost of curing any alleged default’”) (quoting Tishman Constr. Corp. v City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 292, 293 (1996)).
 
This last comment may be overbroad, since defaults come in many forms aside from poor workmanship, some of which may not be curable by the terminated party.  Old Colony Construction, LLC v. Town of Southington, 316 Conn. 202, 113 A.3d 406 (2015), for example, held that liquidated damages could be recovered from a contractor who was terminated for convenience.  But if a contractor’s right to cure is vitiated by a termination for convenience, uncured defects in its work may well leave the owner with no recourse.
 
This is not to say that every termination for convenience clause is so worded as to leave the terminating party without a remedy for defective work.  Parties are free to craft language preserving that right.  How New Hampshire courts will rule on the matter will undoubtedly depend on the precise clause at issue.  But this much is reasonably certain: if the contract afforded the terminated party with an opportunity to correct deficiencies -- Section 12.2.1 of the popular AIA form A201 General Conditions is an example -- termination for convenience is far more likely to preclude recovery for uncured defects.  An owner who has cause to terminate a contract, but chooses instead to terminate for convenience, may end up regretting it.
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#74:  Disclaiming Implied Warranties: Public Policy Considerations

1/1/2019

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A necessary principle of contract law is that “[p]arties generally are bound by the terms of an agreement freely and openly entered into,” Mills v. Nashua Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 121 N.H. 722, 726 (1981).  The word “generally” here is important, for courts “will not enforce a contract or contract term that contravenes public policy,” Harper v. Healthsource New Hampshire, 140 N.H. 770, 775 (1996). “An agreement is against public policy if it is injurious to the interests of the public, contravenes some established interest of society, violates some public statute, is against good morals, tends to interfere with the public welfare or safety, or, as it is sometimes put, if it is at war with the interests of society and is in conflict with the morals of the time.”  Id. (quotation omitted).

The implied warranty of habitability attending new construction, affording consumers a minimum level of protection against latent defects that are not readily identifiable from inspection of the premises, is itself a creature of public policy.  Nevertheless, a contractor or developer will occasionally try to disclaim it, usually by providing an express limited warranty in connection with new construction that limits a customer’s remedies to the strict terms of the limited warranty to the exclusion of any other warranties express or implied -- including implied warranties of workmanship and habitability.  This puts the public policy behind the implied warranty in tension with freedom of contract.

Nowhere is this tension more stark than in the case of building codes, which by their nature are public policy expressions of the minimum level of required protection for occupants of buildings. Any effort by a contractor or developer to disclaim the implied warranty of good workmanship or the implied warranty of habitability will, to the extent that code compliance is embraced by the warranty, be suspect.
 
While our Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule on the issue, Massachusetts courts have long held that disclaimers of implied warranties, which include but go beyond building code compliance, are invalid.  This was recently reaffirmed in Trustees of The Cambridge Point Condominium Trust v. Cambridge Point, LLC, 478 Mass. 697, 705 (2018):
 
“Massachusetts has a well-established public policy in favor of the safety and habitability of homes, as reflected in our implied warranty of habitability under common law and in the legislative enactment of building codes. . . . We have emphasized that ‘[the implied warranty] cannot be waived or disclaimed, because to permit the disclaimer of a warranty protecting a purchaser from the consequences of latent defects would defeat the very purpose of the warranty.’” (citation omitted).

In this regard it is worth noting the mandatory language of RSA 155-A:2,VII: “The contractor of a building, building component, or structure shall be responsible for meeting the minimum requirements of the state building code and state fire code.”  Allowing the contractor and its customer to waive this responsibility as between themselves would, of course, not preclude code enforcement officials from insisting on repairs, but as a practical matter once the building is occupied by the customer, it is the customer who will bear the wrath of code enforcement officials.  A disclaimer of an implied warranty embracing code compliance would deprive the customer of recourse against the contractor, and negate the statutory protection.

Declaring the implied warranty unwaivable on public policy grounds would avoid another thorny issue: if the first purchaser agrees to the builder’s disclaimer but a subsequent purchaser does not, will the subsequent purchaser -- to whom the implied warranty extends as well, see Lempke v. Dagenais, 130 N.H. 782 (1988) -- be stuck with his seller’s disclaimer?  
 
Until our Supreme Court speaks to these issues, lawyers can only guess at the outcome; but I advise my contractor clients that while they are free to try, they should not count on their disclaimers and waivers passing muster, at least where code violations are in play.
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#73:  Do Contractors Have a Right to Fix Their Own Defective Work?

11/7/2018

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Some months back I blogged (#59) on New Hampshire’s “Right to Repair” statute, RSA 359-G, and I noted its limitations and lack of teeth.  It applies only to residential construction, and it provides little more than a temporary delay in a homeowner’s ability to sue.  It does not address whether, once an owner sues, the contractor’s rejected offer to repair defective work will be a defense to claims for damages measured by the cost of having a third party do the repairs.
 
There are few safer bets than that the cost of third party repair will exceed what it would cost the defendant contractor to make things right.  Since plaintiffs have a duty to mitigate their damages where reasonably possible, you might think that refusing to afford the contractor a repair opportunity is risky business for the owner.  Well, not so much.  Our courts generally take a “once burned, twice shy” approach to the question, and usually support an owner’s lack of confidence that the original contractor will improve its performance if given a second bite at the apple.   Wrobleski v. Constellation Corp., 118 N.H. 532, 533 (1978), is the leading authority for this approach.  I’ll let the Supreme Court’s words speak for themselves here:
 
“[D]efendant asserts that it had offered to remedy the plaintiffs’ septic system problem for a cost of approximately $500 and that it was improper for plaintiffs to hire someone else to reconstruct the leach field at a cost of $1,200.  Plaintiffs were not compelled to solve their problem only by the use of employees of the defendant, and the master could conclude that based on the past performance of the defendant, plaintiffs need not further repose confidence in its ability to correctly solve the leach field problem.”
 
Wrobleski suggests that the conclusion that lack of trust is justified based on a contractor's past performance is not compelled; it is merely permissible.  The circumstances of the particular defect and the complexity of its repair will determine whether that conclusion is sound in any given case -- and that will almost always be a question for the jury.  Something more than merely leaving a job before applying the final coat of paint will need to be in play; the circumstances must suggest a lack of skill rather than a lack of attention to detail.
 
Most contractors facing a plausible claim for defective work will want to make the offer of repair right away, for two reasons.  First, not doing so may doom any mitigation of damages defense down the road.  See Berkshire Medical Center, Inc. v. U.W. Marx, Inc., 644 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2011) (“As for giving Marx the option of doing the replacement job itself, Berkshire had little reason to think that Marx either could be trusted to do it or would have any interest in doing so”). Second, the offer, if rejected, cannot be used against the contractor in court as evidence that he admitted liability.  Rule of Evidence 408 provides that “evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount.” 
 
The wiser course is for the parties’ contract to address the issue up front, by providing both a right to repair and a duty to repair defects discovered during the warranty period.  The popular AIA form A201 (2017), General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, takes this approach in Section 12.2.2.1 (“During the one-year period for correction of Work, if the Owner fails to notify the Contractor and give the Contractor an opportunity to make the correction, the Owner waives the rights to require correction by the Contractor and to make a claim for breach of warranty.").
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#72:  Determining the Amount of a Mechanic's Lien

10/7/2018

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A contractor is thrown off a job midstream for alleged shoddy work and/or slow performance.  He sues the owner for his unpaid contract balance.  His contract provides for interest and attorneys’ fees if payment is not timely made, so he adds both to his complaint.  The owner then counterclaims for the cost of correcting items of poor workmanship and for the cost of completing the unfinished work (which the owner claims will exceed the unpaid contract balance), and perhaps for delay damages as well.

Suppose the contractor applied for and got a mechanic’s lien attachment on an ex parte basis in the full amount of his claims (unpaid balance, interest and anticipated attorneys’ fees).  If the owner then files an objection to the lien and asks for a hearing, what will be grounds for the judge to reduce or eliminate the lien?

The starting point is the basic mechanic’s lien rule in RSA 447:2 that anyone who furnishes labor or materials to improve another’s property “shall have a lien on any material so furnished and on said structure, and on any right of the owner to the lot of land on which it stands.”  The word “shall” here means what it says.  The lien is a matter of right so long as it is timely and properly perfected.  Timeliness is governed by RSA 447:9, providing that the lien “shall continue for 120 days after the services are performed, or the materials, supplies or other things are furnished.” Perfection is governed by RSA 447:10, providing that a mechanic’s lien is secured “by attachment of the property upon which it exists at any time while the lien continues.”  

Because an attachment is a court order, it is tempting to assume that all of the provisions of New Hampshire’s pre-judgment attachment statute, RSA 511-A, will apply to that effort -- including RSA 511-A:3, which requires “the plaintiff to show that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment including interest and costs on any amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment.”  This statute focuses on the ultimate judgment, where counterclaims will matter; any judgment will necessarily be reduced by a successful counterclaim.  But a number of Superior Court decisions, including Consolidated Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. SES Concord Co., No. 89-C-571/579 (Merrimack County Superior Ct., Nov. 21, 1989), and West Side Dev. Group, LLC v. D’Amour, No. 04-C-018, (Carroll County Superior Ct., March 24, 2004), have held that the provisions of RSA 511-A:3 do not apply to mechanic’s lien attachments, thus relieving the contractor of the burden of proving a reasonable likelihood of getting a judgment at least equal to the lien amount.  Our federal court has followed suit.  H.E. Contracting v. Franklin Pierce College, 360 F.Supp.2d 289 (D.N.H. 2005).

Freed of the burden of showing a likelihood that he will recover a judgment “equal to or greater than than the amount of the attachment,” the contractor will be allowed to lien for the amount of his claim regardless of whether the owner may have a setoff against that amount at trial.  The amount of the lien will be the unpaid contract sum, i.e., the contractually agreed value of the labor and materials furnished.  The owner may be able to argue that defective goods and deficient work must be taken into account in valuing the contractor’s performance, but not all courts will lend an ear to that argument at the attachment hearing, preferring to leave that claim for trial and not gut the lien at the pretrial stage.

Note that the inapplicability of RSA 511-A:3 cuts both ways; a mechanic’s lien attachment will not include “interest and costs” (which for this purpose will include attorneys’ fees).  If those amounts were included in the lien amount ex parte, subtracting them may be the owner’s lone victory at the attachment hearing.
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#71:  Product Warranties of Future Performance

9/30/2018

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Consider this scenario:  Owner needs a new roof, and sees Manufacturer’s advertisement for “30-year shingles.”  He picks up a catalog, which trumpets “30 year protection.”  The limited warranty at the end states that if the shingles fail in the first 30 years due to manufacturing defects, Manufacturer will pay to replace them according to a prorated formula (the longer into the 30 years, the lesser the Manufacturer’s liability) but excluding the costs of tear down, disposal and new installation.  Owner buys them, believing that they will last for 30 years.  
 
In 15 years, the shingles fail and Owner sues Manufacturer for the cost of a new roof -- including the tear down, disposal and new installation costs.  Owner says that he has no recollection of reading the limited warranty, but relied on Manufacturer’s marketing catalog, which gave the impression of an express warranty that the shingles would last 30 years.  He points to Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813 (2005), which held that a statement in window marketing materials asserting that the window would be “permanently” protected against rot was an affirmation or promise creating a warranty of future performance.
 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code governing the sale of goods, an express warranty is created by “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain,” or “[a]ny description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain.”  RSA 382-A:2-313(1).  The seller can fashion the terms of its warranty and limit it in various ways -- for example, by excluding liability for costs beyond repair and replacement.  Unless a shorter duration is agreed to, a four year statute of limitations governs lawsuits for breach of warranty commencing on date of delivery, RSA 382-A:2-725(1) -- but if the warranty “explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance,” then the clock starts ticking “when the breach is or should have been discovered.”  RSA 382-A:2-725(2).
 
The alleged catalog promise in our hypothetical expressly extends to future performance, so Owner’s lawsuit is timely.  Assuming that the limited warranty did not exclude all other warranties -- a common provision in limited warranties -- the remaining question is, how do we reconcile the two warranties?  The New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Faro v. IKO Industries, Inc., No. 2017-0325, 2018 WL 915116 (Jan. 26, 2018), sheds some light on this.
 
In Faro a homeowner relied on a shingle manufacturer’s marketing materials which “contained language, such as ‘30-year’ shingles, that would lead a consumer to believe that the shingles would last for the duration of the warranty.”  The trial judge held that “the only representations in these marketing materials pertaining to duration are that the . . . shingle is backed by a ‘limited’ 30 or 35 year warranty” and therefore were not “guarantees that the . . . shingles will last for a particular number of years, but rather an affirmation that the shingles come with a 30 or 35 year limited warranty.”  The Supreme Court agreed, finding no “representation of the defendant that the shingles, without limitation, would last for thirty or thirty-five years.”
 
The Faro case should be considered in connection with RSA 382-A:2-317’s admonition that “Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall determine which warranty is dominant.”  The reasonableness of construing a catalog warranty as independent of a limited warranty contained in the same document has gotten a little dicier after Faro.  If there is no reasonable way to divorce them, the buyer will be stuck with his remedies under the limited warranty, terms which are typically more favorable to the seller.
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#70:  Owner and GC Tort Duties to Subcontractor Employees

8/11/2018

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It is commonplace for subcontractors to promise to provide for the safety of their employees, and for general contractors to promise the owner that they will maintain site safety as well.  Who is liable for injuries to the sub’s employees in such cases?  The recent case of Grady v. Jones Lang Lasalle Construction Co., 171 N.H. 203 (2018), provides some guidance.
 
Steven Grady was an employee of A&M, a roofing subcontractor to Jones Lang on a project in Dover owned by Liberty Mutual.  A&M’s subcontract required it to assume full responsibility for implementing safety programs on the project, to maintain all work areas in a safe manner, and to furnish all safety equipment.  But on one cold and windy February day, A&M did not furnish rubber gloves and fire-proof leather gloves to Grady when he was using a cleaning solvent and a torch to melt ice on the roof -- and Grady ended up burning his hand.  He couldn’t sue A&M due to the Workers’ Compensation Law’s exclusivity provision, but he could and did sue the GC and the owner, claiming that they owed him a duty to maintain a safe working environment.
 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court disagreed.  Noting that “A&M, not Jones Lang, supervised him and provided him with the equipment that he used,” the Court decided that Jones Lang’s general duty to monitor the site for dangerous conditions was not implicated.  Nor could Grady rely on Jones Lang’s promise in its general contract with the owner to “be responsible for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs,” and to be “fully responsible” for “the acts, errors, omissions, defaults and conduct of all Subcontractors.”  The Court found this promise to be solely for the owner’s benefit.
 
The Court also mentioned that the general contract “required Jones Lang to require any subcontractor to assume the same responsibilities for the subcontracted work, and A&M in fact assumed those responsibilities in the subcontract,” and that A&M was “the party in the best position to know about the particular dangers involved in its specialty work and to provide appropriate equipment and supervision to safely perform that work.”  Had Jones Lang itself undertaken to provide any services necessary for the protection of Grady, or had Jones Lang altered the conditions of the roofing work or the equipment needed to perform it, the Court indicated that the outcome might have been different.  The lesson for general contractors is clear: make sure your subcontract shifts safety responsibility downstream, and then let your sub handle its own safety program; don’t mess with its implementation.
 
Grady also sued Liberty Mutual on the theory that owners are liable for injuries resulting from “inherently dangerous activity” on their premises.  The Court ruled that winter roofing work itself is not inherently dangerous; rather, the employee created a new and unanticipated danger when he used a torch and solvent without proper gloves.  It also rejected Grady’s claim that a business owner is vicariously liability to invitees at its premises for the negligence of independent contractors.  The Court noted that A&M had agreed to indemnify the owner from any claims arising out of A&M’s negligence -- which meant that A&M would ultimately have to foot the bill, a result contrary to the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law.
 
Because the Grady case held that neither the GC nor the owner owed any duty to the subcontractor’s employees to keep them safe from the type of risk involved there, the question of their negligence -- i.e., whether a duty was breached -- never got addressed.  We’ll never know whether their failing to prevent Grady’s use of a torch and cleaning solvent on a windy day without proper gloves was negligent.  Frankly, I can’t imagine any jury finding that it would have been; Grady’s accident was not reasonably foreseeable to the owner or the GC.
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#69:  Measures of Adequacy in Contract Performance

7/4/2018

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In their first year of law school, budding lawyers learn in Contracts class about the “perfect tender” rule and the “substantial performance” rule.  These alternative measures of adequate performance raise precisely the issue that their words suggest: must a contracting “promisor” give the “promisee” (please forgive the legalese) exactly what was promised, or is a “close enough” standard applicable?
 
In construction cases, “close enough” is not enough to prevent a breach of contract from occurring, but when a failure to deliver a perfect tender of the design and construction elements of the contract causes the other party no damages, “close enough” will yield the same financial result as no breach at all.
 
The leading case is Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921).  The contract in that case specified Reading pipe, but different pipe identical to Reading pipe in every material way was inadvertently installed, a mistake first discovered after construction was complete.  The court refused to allow the owner to withhold from final payment the cost of tearing out and replacing the off-spec pipe, ruling that while “[t]here is no general license to install whatever, in the builder’s judgment, may be regarded as ‘just as good,’” nevertheless the court “must weigh the purpose to be served, the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter, the cruelty of enforced adherence.  Then only can we tell whether literal fulfillment is to be implied by law as a condition . . . In the circumstances of this case, we think the measure of the allowance is not the cost of replacement, which would be great, but the difference in value, which would be either nominal or nothing.”

Whether “substantial performance” has been met in a given case goes far beyond the functional equivalency of brand name components.  Quality is in the eye of the beholder, and contractors’ views of what is “good enough” may not match owners’ views.  Building codes address only a fraction of the myriad ways that quality of construction can come into play, and even those codes are subject to interpretation.  See Streit v. Callahan, 122 N.H. 244 (1982) (affirming a verdict that stairs constructed with a nine-inch tread but at an angle of less than ninety degrees between tread and riser were defective, based on an expert’s interpretation of the code).
 
One way to head off disagreements on quality, particularly for dimensional and positional aspects of the construction, is to agree in advance on tolerances -- the allowable deviation from “perfect” -- when considering how tight, how smooth, or how plumb/level/square the construction must be in order to count as “good enough.”  In the residential setting, the National Association of Home Builders publishes “Residential Construction Performance Guidelines,” now in its fifth edition, which sets out minimum performance criteria that can be incorporated into the parties’ contract.  Other trade associations publish similar guidelines for specific industries (the National Frame Building Association, American Concrete Institute, and American Institute of Steel Constructors come to mind).  If agreed upon up front, these published standards will govern.
 
Sometimes a dispute over whether the contractor’s implied warranty of workmanlike quality has been met will spark the argument that such industry trade group standards define the standard of good workmanship even without their express incorporation into the parties’ contract.  Our Supreme Court has yet to adopt that view.  While those standards are admissible evidence on the question, expert testimony is the time-honored way of establishing the mark, and while most experts do rely on such standards, in the end the jury decides both the measure of adequate performance and whether it has been met.
 
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#68:  Energy Code Compliance

6/24/2018

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On June 12, 2018, Governor Sununu signed into law House Bill 1472, repealing the state code for energy conservation in new construction (RSA 155-D) effective August 7, 2018.  RSA 155-D, first enacted in 1979 before the international building codes came into prominence, has largely been redundant since New Hampshire’s adoption of the International Energy Conservation Code as part of its state building code (RSA 155-A) in 2002.  HB 1472 was intended to clean up that redundancy.  But repeal of the old law may have an unintended consequence.
 
As with RSA 155-D, the 2009 IECC -- the version currently in effect in New Hampshire -- has different rules for residential and commercial buildings.  (Residential buildings more than three stories above grade are considered commercial for code compliance purposes; commercial buildings three stories or less above grade may show compliance with residential requirements instead.)  Under RSA 155-D:4, plans for both types of construction bearing the certification of a licensed architect or engineer that the design met code had to be submitted to the public utilities commission for review and approval (with the default rule that unless the commission notified the applicant of noncompliance “within 15 working days of receipt, they shall be considered automatically approved”).  The commission historically issued a permit only for residential construction (based on submission of application form EC-1), and relied on the design professional's certification without issuing a permit for commercial construction.
 
Section 103.1 of the 2009 IECC provides that “[t]he construction documents shall be prepared by a registered design professional where required by the statutes of the jurisdiction in which the project is to be constructed.”  Upon repeal of RSA 155-D, New Hampshire has no such statute. The new law partially plugs the gap on the residential side, requiring the Building Code Review Board to develop “a simplified residential energy code compliance form based upon the energy provisions in the International Residential Code and the International Energy Conservation Code” which, on proper completion, will be accepted by all New Hampshire code enforcement authorities as evidence of compliance with energy code requirements.  But neither an application form nor a design professional’s certification of compliance with energy code requirements is now part of our law for commercial buildings.  The new law explicitly charges the public utility commission with a duty of “verification that the applicable project meets the code requirements” for residential construction, but there is no similar requirement for commercial construction.

As with all building codes, enforcement in New Hampshire is at the local level where the municipality has adopted an enforcement mechanism pursuant to RSA 674:51, and at the state level where there is no local enforcement.  In the latter case, RSA 155-A:7 shifts enforcement authority over the entire building code (of which the IECC is a part) to the state fire marshal or his designee, but only “upon written request of the municipality.”  Thus far no legislation is in the works to bring the public utilities commission into the enforcement mix for commercial buildings, with the result that its rules promulgated under the authority of RSA 155-D are likely to lapse as applied to commercial construction.
 
Perhaps this gap will eventually be plugged in connection with adopting the 2012 or 2015 IECC, both of which significantly increase required R-values, U-values and energy ratings generally, as well as efficiency of mechanical systems and lighting, over the 2009 version currently in force.  New Hampshire is lagging somewhat behind other Northeastern states in keeping up with the triennial revisions to the IECC (Massachusetts, New York and Vermont use the 2015 version, Connecticut and Rhode Island the 2012 version).  The last legislative push to update New Hampshire’s building codes, including the IECC, was defeated in 2016 when the Building Code Review Board's recommendation to adopt the 2015 version of all of the international building codes as a group met with industry lobbying resistance.  Nothing prevents the Board from adopting rules directly amending the code pursuant to RSA 155-A:10, which authorizes such amendments subject to later ratification by the Legislature.
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#67:  Paying Your Subcontractor's Employees

5/28/2018

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Like many states, New Hampshire law requires that if a subcontractor doesn’t pay wages to its employees, the general contractor must pay them.  RSA 275:46.  Similarly, New Hampshire law provides that if a subcontractor doesn’t pay amounts owed to its employees under workers’ compensation laws, the general contractor must cover those as well.  RSA 281-A:18.  If the general contractor must write a check under either of these statutes, the subcontractor will owe reimbursement to the general contractor -- but it’s a safe bet that any subcontractor who can’t meet payroll or pay workers’ comp premiums won’t be able to meet any reimbursement obligation either.  How does a GC protect itself?
 
Before subcontracting any significant portion of a long term job to someone who isn’t known to be financially solvent, the wise general will ask for proof that the sub can carry the strain of weekly payroll through a monthly requisition procedure, with retainage.  If a sub won’t share its current financials, chances are they aren’t pretty.  While some solvent subs would rather protect their financial privacy than land a particular job, it can’t hurt to ask.
 
An insurance certificate showing that the sub has workers comp coverage should always be a prerequisite to allowing the sub to proceed.  While it doesn’t guarantee that the premiums will be paid through the duration of a project expected to last many months, the written subcontract can also provide for direct pre-cancellation notice from the insurer to the general contractor if policy premiums are late.
 
Second, written subcontracts can provide that all payments made to the subcontractor are to be held “in trust” for the benefit of the subcontractor’s employees working on the project, including wages and all associated employee-related expenses.  The main advantage of such “trust fund” provisions is in bankruptcy; trust funds are not considered assets of the subcontractor/debtor that can be distributed to general creditors.
 
On federally funded projects the Davis Bacon Act requires the submission of certified payrolls in order to ensure compliance with the prevailing wage requirements.  (Davis Bacon requirements are yet another instance in which “[t]he prime contractor shall be responsible for the compliance by any subcontractor,” 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a)(6).)  But even on private projects written subcontracts can reserve the right to inspect subcontractor payroll records.  At the first hint of trouble the GC should demand to see them -- and if they aren’t in order, it can withhold payment to the sub. The threat of that withholding may be enough to entice the sub to prioritize scarce dollars toward employee-related debts before feeding any other wolf at the door.
 
Some subcontracts provide that unpaid employees may be paid directly and/or issued joint checks.  I generally do not recommend this except as a last resort.  While it may be the only way to keep them on the job, it also entails the risk that the GC will be deemed a “joint employer” of the sub’s employees -- in which case the GC may have more than just wages to worry about, ranging from fringe benefit claims under collective bargaining agreements with the sub, to Fair Labor Standard Act claims, to Title VII discrimination issues, and more.
 
Finally, the general should insist -- even if the owner doesn’t -- on sworn lien waivers with each progress payment to the sub, verifying that the sub has paid for all labor and materials on the project with the last progress payment and will do so out of the present progress payment.  If the sub falsely swears (it happens!), any principal of the sub signing the lien waiver may also be liable to the general.
 
Bottom line: There is no foolproof protection short of a payment bond, which adds a layer of expense that could narrow the field of available subcontractors.  But hey, who ever said that general contracting was risk-free?
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#66:  Labor Inefficiency Costs: Who Pays? How Much?

4/26/2018

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Among the possible reasons a project might cost more to build than anticipated is diminished labor productivity occasioned by unforeseen space or time constraints.  If the available space for construction gets compressed, workers who are confined by a tighter site or other physical obstacles they didn’t count on, or whose anticipated lay-down or staging areas are shifted to a more distant off-site location, will become less productive.  If the available time for construction gets compressed, work could be pushed into winter conditions when labor is notoriously less efficient, or acceleration could be required with its attendant overtime expenses and consequent fatigue factors making a man-hour less productive.

Sometimes this unanticipated time/space compression is the owner’s fault, in which case the general contractor/construction manager and its subcontractors will likely be entitled to increased compensation by change order or otherwise -- and to a mechanic’s lien if that increase is not paid.  Sometimes unanticipated compression is the result of acts of God or of third parties, in which case it is crucial to examine the contract or subcontract to see who has agreed to bear this risk. (Contractual silence on the point usually spells bad news for the party providing the labor. See Town of Bedford v. Brooks, 121 N.H. 262, 266 (1981) (“One who by contract or agreement binds himself to an obligation possible to perform must perform it, and he will not be excused from performance because of unforeseen difficulties.”)).

What if the unanticipated compression is due to poor planning or coordination by the general contractor or construction manager, affecting not only its own bottom line but its subcontractors’ as well?  It is difficult to see why the owner should pay extra in such a case or suffer a lien from a subcontractor even if that sub is legitimately owed extra compensation from the GC or CM who caused the inefficiencies.  But a recent case suggests that such a lien may be granted if the owner has a cost-plus or “time and materials” arrangement.

In Fraser Engineering Company, Inc. v. IPS-Integrated Project Services, LLC, 2018 WL 1525725 (D.N.H. March 27, 2018), a subcontractor on a project at the Pease International Tradeport obtained a mechanic’s lien for almost $5 million, two-thirds of which was for labor inefficiencies after being ordered by the construction manager to accelerate and work overtime.  The owner argued that it didn’t owe nearly that much to its construction manager and therefore was entitled to invoke the cap on mechanic’s liens described in RSA 447:6, limiting subcontractor liens to “the amount then due or that may become due to the contractor . . .”  Because the owner’s cost-plus contract obliged it to pay its CM for “the cost of trade labor including the indirect costs, overhead and profit for all [s]ubcontractors and equipment necessary for construction,” the Court concluded that the owner could well end up owing its CM the entire amount of the subcontractor’s labor inefficiency claim, and let stand the lien amount which included that sum.

But how is that sum calculated?  In Fraser, the subcontractor’s arrangement with the CM was fixed price rather than cost-plus except as to change orders and extras.  Its $3,324,083.30 “labor inefficiency” number included not only its direct overtime wage expense, but also an uptick for the inefficiency of those manhours due to the fatigue, loss of morale, absenteeism and similar effects of a workforce that was working ten hours a day, seven days a week.  The subcontractor relied on studies estimating such productivity losses -- “Overtime and Productivity in Electrical Construction” published by the National Electrical Contractors Association being a chief one -- but even that study acknowledged that “Obviously, these overtime cost calculations are unnecessary for labor-plus-material type contract situations.”  Why simply paying agreed-upon overtime rates for each overtime hour would not fully compensate the subcontractor for all labor inefficiencies is unclear.  (And because the case is now in arbitration, it will likely stay that way.)

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#65:  Unjust Enrichment Recovery for Verbal Change Orders

3/24/2018

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Given the importance of nailing down any changes to an original scope of work along with their price and schedule effects, many construction contracts require change orders to be in writing, and even define change orders as written instruments.  Section 7.2.1 of the A201 (2017) is typical: “A Change Order is a written instrument prepared by the Architect and signed by the Owner, Contractor and Architect.”  Some contracts are even more limiting, expressly stating that if extra work is done without a signed change order, no additional compensation can be claimed.
 
What if an owner orders a change but never prepares the written change order?  What if the contractor prepares a change order himself but the owner ignores it?  Should he suspend work, and risk being in breach?  There may be another option.  If he proceeds with the work on the reasonable expectation of getting a change order signed later and doesn’t get it, he still has a shot at “unjust enrichment” recovery -- a remedy allowed by courts when an individual receives “a benefit which would be unconscionable for him to retain,” Clapp v. Goffstown Sch. Dist., 159 N.H. 206, 210 (2009).  
 
Unjust enrichment recovery “may be available to contracting parties if the benefit received is outside the scope of the contract,” Axenics, Inc. v. Turner Construction Co., 164 N.H. 659, 670 (2013), but not if the parties’ contract addresses the subject matter of the claim.  In Axenics a subcontractor’s claim against a general contractor for “failure to properly coordinate construction” was rejected because the GC’s coordination responsibility and the sub’s entitlement to payment for any resulting extra work or extra costs “was addressed in the subcontract itself.”  The Court explained that “the terms of the subcontract expressly addressed the possibility of delays and hindrances as well as the process by which Axenics would receive payment for any extra work that it performed because of change orders.  The subcontract also established a mechanism for proceeding when Axenics believed the ‘work to be beyond the scope of’ the subcontract, and delineated Turner’s responsibilities for coordinating changes to the work.  Since the subcontract governed the subject of Axenics’ unjust enrichment claim, and the subcontract was not abandoned by the parties, the trial court erred in allowing Axenics to recover against Turner under a theory of unjust enrichment.”
 
Notice that Axenics did not seek compensation for an added scope of work, but for making an existing scope more expensive to perform.  Added scope sounds like a candidate for unjust enrichment on grounds that “the benefit received was outside the scope of the contract,” id.  But I hesitate to equate a contractual scope of work with “scope of the contract.”  Contractors speak that way.  Judges don’t.  For them, “scope of the contract” is broader, encompassing not only the work to be done but all of the terms and conditions impacting the performance of that work.  
 
Still, any contractual provision can be modified by the parties -- including a provision requiring that change orders be in writing.  “Parties to a contract can not, even by an express provision in that contract, deprive themselves of the power to alter or vary or discharge it by subsequent agreement.  An express provision in a written contract that no rescission or variation shall be valid unless it too is in writing is ineffective to invalidate a subsequent oral agreement to the contrary.”  Prime Financial Group, Inc. v. Masters, 141 N.H. 33, 37 (1996).  Ordering extra work that both parties should reasonably anticipate will entail extra costs, particularly when accompanied by insistence that it be done promptly before a change order is prepared and signed, is evidence from which a court might infer an agreement to modify the requirement that change orders must be signed before extras can get paid.
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#64:  Recovering Attorneys' Fees as Damages

2/25/2018

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Win, lose or draw, the usual rule in litigation is that “absent statutorily or judicially created exceptions, parties pay their own attorney’s fees.”  Shelton v. Tamposi, 164 N.H. 490, 501 (2013).  Judicial exceptions include “bad faith” litigation, for which “an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate where one party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, where the litigant’s conduct can be characterized as unreasonably obdurate or obstinate, and where it should have been unnecessary for the successful party to have brought the action.”  Bedard v. Town of Alexandria, 159 N.H. 740, 744 (2010) (quotations omitted).
 
In such two-party scenarios, attorneys’ fees are awarded not as damages caused by the defendant’s conduct, but “to do justice and vindicate rights, as well as to discourage frivolous lawsuits.”  Jesurum v. WBTSCC Ltd. Partnership, 169 N.H. 469, 483 (2016) (quotation omitted). But matters are different in three-party scenarios, where A is forced to litigate with B due to the acts or omissions of C.  Legal fees incurred by A in the skirmish with B may be recovered from C as damages, i.e., as the natural and foreseeable consequence of C’s wrongful conduct.
 
Suppose a design professional administering a construction contract advises the owner that a problem with the project is due to a construction defect when, in fact, it is the result of the professional’s own design error.  If the owner sues the contractor for breach of contract and the contractor prevails, the contractor’s defense costs should be recoverable as damages in an action by the contractor against the design professional.  This is sometimes known as the “tort of another” doctrine, after its formulation in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914(2): “One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover . . . attorney fees . . . thereby suffered or incurred in the earlier action.”

Our Supreme Court recently had this “tort of another” doctrine on its plate in Halifax-American Energy Co., LLC v. Provider Power, LLC, 170 N.H. 569 (2018), but decided not to dig in.  A Rockingham County Superior Court jury was instructed that it could award damages on this basis, and it did so; but when the defendant appealed on grounds that this was not the law in New Hampshire, the Supreme Court ruled that “the defendants did not argue before the trial court that the court's proposed jury instruction was inconsistent with New Hampshire law. Thus, we decline to consider that argument on appeal.”  The Supreme Court left the jury’s award intact.

The lower court’s jury instructions certainly had some legs; there is precedent in New Hampshire for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating with a third party.  Hubbard v. Gould, 74 N.H. 25, 28 (1906) (“If it is established that the defendants and not the plaintiff are responsible for the injury to Rogers’ horse, the expenses reasonably incurred in good faith by Hubbard in litigating the questions raised by Rogers’ claim are a part of his damages”); Hildreth v. Bergeron, 110 N.H 197, 199 (1970) ("If the alleged contract was breached he is entitled to all expenses resulting from the breach including attorney's fees both in defending the Gilbert action and prosecuting the suit over against the suppliers.").  This result has been characterized by several implied, non-contractual indemnity cases as a proper item for indemnification.  Morse v. Ford, 118 N.H. 280, 281 (1978) (“Our cases have held that attorney’s fees are proper when an indemnitor is primarily responsible for the injury to the third party”); General Contracting & Trading Co., LLC v. Interpole, Inc., 899 F.2d 109, 113 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying New Hampshire law) (“the indemnitee’s damages may include reasonable counsel fees and costs necessarily expended in defending against the principal claim”).
 
Whether analyzed under implied indemnity principles or labeled the “tort of another” doctrine, recovery of attorneys’ fees as damages does seem to be available in New Hampshire in three-party scenarios.
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#63:  Subcontractor or Supplier: A Potentially Crucial Distinction

12/27/2017

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On most building contracts the contractor is called upon to provide labor, materials and equipment.  He will often hire subcontractors to furnish various portions of the labor and materials, and either he or they will purchase equipment (such as a boiler or a well pump) for installation at the job site.  On high end commercial projects the required equipment can be quite large and specialized (say, a gas turbine for a utility power plant).  Is the seller of that equipment considered a subcontractor, or a mere manufacturer/supplier?
 
The distinction can be important on many levels.  For one thing, the Uniform Commercial Code rather than general contract law governs the sale of goods, and employs different legal rules, including special warranty provisions and a longer statute of limitations.  For another, payment bond rights and mechanic’s lien rights were held unavailable for suppliers to suppliers (as opposed to suppliers to subcontractors) in Lyle Signs, Inc. v. Evroks Corp., 132 N.H. 156 (1989). Third, general contractors will often be expressly liable under their contracts for the mistakes of their subcontractors. If they are obliged to install particular equipment (and even directed as to which manufacturers they may buy that equipment from), characterizing the equipment supplier as a subcontractor can be the owner’s only shot at holding the contractor responsible when the equipment whose characteristics the owner itself has specified proves deficient!
 
The Lyle Signs case offers some rough guidance on when an entity is considered a subcontractor, admonishing that “courts should look, in part, to the following factors: (1) Whether the entity constructs a definite and substantial part of the work or improvement called for in the original contract; (2) whether the work is performed in accordance with plans and specifications of the original contract; and (3) whether the plans and specifications call for a unique product and not a product readily available on the open market. Lastly, we note that the work need not be done at the job site for one to be considered a subcontractor. The above list, however, is not intended to be a comprehensive list of the factors which may be considered by courts. Furthermore, in applying these factors to their determinations, courts should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the contractual relationship of the parties.” 
 
The following year In re Trailer & Plumbing Supplies, 133 N.H. 432, 436 (1990), considered two tests for whether a mixed sales and services contract was governed by the UCC.  The first is the “predominant factor” test, which inquires “whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved (e.g., contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved (e.g., installation of a water heater in a bathroom).”  The second is the “gravamen of the action” test, which “simply asks whether the underlying action is brought because of alleged defective goods or because of the quality of the service rendered. If the gravamen of the action focuses on goods, then the UCC governs. If the focus is on the quality of the services rendered, then common law applies.”  Ultimately the Court in that case applied the “predominant factor” test – as has virtually every court case since then.
 
Can a manufacturer/supplier who is subject to the UCC under the “predominant factor” test also be a subcontractor under the Lyle Signs factors?  Theoretically, yes; the two tests are not wholly inconsistent.  A 2015 New Hampshire Superior Court case, Hooksett Sewer Commission v. Penta Corporation, No. 13-CV-540 (Merrimack Super. Aug.12, 2015), ruled a general contractor to be subject to the UCC under the “predominant factor” test when it purchased and installed specified equipment and related items that together comprised two thirds of the cost of the entire contract.  There was no mention of the Lyle Signs factors, nor reason to consider them, but the GC in Hooksett Sewer would have satisfied all three of them.
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#62:  The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

11/28/2017

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“In every agreement, there is an implied covenant that the parties will act in good faith and fairly with one another.”  So states Birch Broadcasting, Inc. v. Capitol Broadcasting Corp., Inc., 161 N.H. 192, 198 (2010), and many other New Hampshire court cases.  But what does this really mean?  And how does it shake out in construction contracts?
 
As the Birch Broadcasting case notes, “implied good-faith obligations fall into three general categories: (1) contract formation; (2) termination of at-will employment agreements; and (3) limitation of discretion in contractual performance.”  The third category is the one most relevant to construction contracts.  It prohibits an exercise of contractual discretion “inconsistent with the parties’ agreed-upon common purpose and justified expectations as well as ‘with common standards of decency, fairness and reasonableness.’”  Id.

The first thing to notice is that the implied covenant comes into play only when one party has the discretion to act in a way that could deprive the other party of the expected benefits of its bargain.  Discretion exists where “a legal directive or contract term is indeterminate because it fails to identify a single specific action that is legally permitted, prohibited, or required under the circumstances.”  Milford-Bennington R. Co. v. Pan Am Railways, Inc., No. 10-cv-00264-PB, 2011 WL 6300923 at *5 (D.N.H. Dec. 16, 2011), aff’d, 695 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 2012).  In other words, not everything is nailed down; the contract presents an opportunity for one party to move the goal posts on the other party after the contract has been entered into.  Conversely, if the claimant has an express contractual right to the benefit it seeks, the other party’s refusal to tender that benefit is simply a breach of an express rather than an implied contract term.  No true discretion exists.

The second thing to notice is the tension between “two apparently inconsistent principles: that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be implied to limit the exercise of a discretionary power, and that express terms of a contract cannot be varied by an implied covenant.”  Hobin v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 144 N.H. 626, 630 (2000).  The apparent dilemma is resolved by examining the degree of specificity with which the contract allows the challenged conduct.  If the exercise of discretion yields an outcome that is specifically mentioned as authorized by the contract, courts will not impose reasonableness limits on the exercise of that discretion.  Rouleau v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 1757104, at *5 (D.N.H. Apr. 17, 2015) (“a party does not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing simply by invoking a specific, limited right that is expressly granted by an enforceable contract”).  In such a case the exercise of discretion would necessarily be consistent with, not inconsistent with, the parties’ “agreed-upon common purpose and justified expectations.”
 
In construction settings, claims of breach of the implied covenant will almost always be “upstream” claims, by a subcontractor against a general contractor or by a general contractor against an owner.  Where I see the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicated most often is in the rescheduling of work.  An instance is New Design Constr. Co., Inc. v. Hamon Contractors, Inc., 215 P.3d 1172 (Colo.App.Div. 2 2008).  As is commonly the case, Hamon, the general contractor, had the contractual right to modify the project schedule.  When it did so to the detriment of its paving sub, it crossed the line.  The Court noted that “Hamon was responsible for developing and maintaining a schedule, NDCC was responsible for completing its work when directed by Hamon to do so, and Hamon was required not to abuse its discretion when directing NDCC to complete its work.”  Id. at 1182.
 
The wise contract drafter attempts to identify areas of discretion, and tries to limit them.  Nothing prevents contracting parties from flagging potential instances of application of the implied covenant -- for example, with language making one party’s action subject to the other’s consent but providing that such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
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#61:  Excusing Delays in Completion

10/30/2017

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Under the rule that parties to a contract have a duty not to hinder or delay each other’s performance, an owner cannot recover damages for a delay in completion of the contractor’s work if the owner or his agents slowed down the contractor’s performance.  But sometimes a third party, or the government, or a casualty or other circumstances will delay final completion of the project of which the contractor’s work is only a part, without hindering the contractor’s own work.  In such a case, is the contractor excused from meeting his contractual deadline on the theory that the need for strict compliance with his deadline has become moot?
 
An example will illustrate the issue.  Suppose an owner contracts separately with two prime contractors -- let’s call them “Eastbound” and “Westbound” -- each of whom is to build 500 feet of a one-thousand foot tunnel, each at the same unit price per foot, each in 100 days starting on the same day and ending at the same designated point smack in the middle of the mountain.  If the tunnel is not completed on time and no extensions have been granted, consider how damages (whether actual or liquidated) should be assessed if:

A.  Eastbound reaches the midpoint 10 days late, and Westbound reaches the midpoint 50 days late; or
 
B.  With Westbound well behind schedule, Eastbound -- who is tunneling at the rate of five feet per day and is thus on pace to complete on time -- takes seven weeks off to do a different job and reaches the midpoint 49 days late, while Westbound reaches the midpoint 50 days late.
 
Under both scenarios Eastbound will argue that it is off the hook because its failure to meet its target completion date did not delay opening the tunnel given Westbound’s greater delay.  The only difference is that under scenario B, Eastbound could have finished on time but chose instead to take advantage of an opportunity to moonlight when some unanticipated “float” fell into its lap.
 
Contract law recognizes the doctrine of “frustration of purpose,” which “assumes the possibility of literal performance but excuses performance because supervening events have essentially destroyed the purpose for which the contract was made.”  Perry v. Champlain Oil Company, 101 N.H. 97, 98 (1957).  Normally the doctrine excuses a party’s performance when the value of the contract to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by an unanticipated and fortuitous event.  But here, timely performance has turned out to be of no value to the owner, who is not the one seeking to be excused from the contractual deadline.  Moreover, performance of the entire contract has not lost its value to the owner; only the completion deadline has lost its value, and only for a relatively short time.  The commercial frustration defense is a poor fit.
 
“No harm,” then, does not necessarily mean “no foul.”  But it may mean “no remedy.”  An owner who must prove actual damages (because there is no enforceable liquidated damages clause), but cannot pin loss of use of the project as a whole on Eastbound, is unlikely to be awarded any damages for the breach.  If, however, liquidated damages are sought, the result could be different, since proof of actual damages is not necessary for enforcement of a liquidated damages provision.
 
Scenario B presents an additional issue.  If Eastbound was on pace to finish on time and Westbound was lagging, the owner could have issued change orders adding 100 feet to Eastbound’s scope and deducting 100 feet from Westbound’s scope, resulting in faster completion of the tunnel (120 days rather than 150) at no additional cost.   By not keeping Eastbound on site, the owner signaled that prompt completion was not important to the purpose of the contract, and may have waived his right to complain about late completion.
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#60:  Getting a Mechanic's Lien Attachment Without Giving Advance Notice

9/3/2017

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Unlike most states, New Hampshire requires an “attachment” – a court order that property shall be held as security – before a mechanic’s lien may be filed.  RSA 447:9 provides that the lien “shall continue for 120 days after the services are performed, or the materials, supplies or other things are furnished” while RSA 447:10 specifies that “Any such lien may be secured by attachment of the property upon which it exists at any time while the lien continues.”  But a different statute, RSA 511-A, governs the procedure for getting the attachment approved and recorded.
 
The basic rule is found in RSA 511-A:1, which provides that “a defendant shall be given notice and an opportunity for a preliminary hearing before any pre-judgment attachment, including attachments of property held by a trustee, shall be made.”  An exception exists when there is a need for speed and all will be lost if the claimant must await notice and a hearing.  But mechanic’s lien attachments are routinely granted without advance notice to the defendant even if there is no such emergency.
 
The statutory authority for dispensing with advance notice is RSA 511-A:8: “Upon application to the court, in exceptional circumstances, an attachment may be ordered in advance of notice to the defendant if the plaintiff establishes probable cause to the satisfaction of the court of his basic right to recovery and the amount thereof and in addition thereto the existence of any of the following: . . .”  Five scenarios follow, including  “III. In equity cases for specific performance of an agreement to transfer land or a unique chattel, there is imminent danger of transfer to a bona fide third party.  In such land cases, as well as those to perfect a labor and materials lien under RSA 447, a writ of attachment may be filed at a registry of deeds without prior application and notice, provided said writ is in the form of a lis pendens and specifically restricts its application to the particular real estate described in the writ and the return of attachment.”
 
Let’s break this down.  First, the would-be lienor must show “probable cause to the satisfaction of the court of his basic right to recovery and the amount thereof.”  Second, “a writ of attachment may be filed at a registry of deeds without prior application” – that is, without prior application to the court (don’t ask me how one can both make “application to the court” yet not apply to the court at all!) – as long as it is in the form of a lis pendens.  A lis pendens (Latin for “pending suit”) puts third parties on notice of a lawsuit (presumably one filed by the would-be lienor in which the attachment is being sought).  The "application to the court" and "without prior application" tension was resolved in Topjian Plumbing and Heating, Inc. v. Bruce Topjian, Inc., 129 N.H. 481, 484 (1987), ruling that “recording a lis pendens gives notice but does not create an attachment or perfect a lien.”
 
It seems clear that the Legislature intended this lis pendens option solely as a means of avoiding the problem that would otherwise arise under RSA 511-A:5 (“Such attachments shall not be effective against bona fide purchasers for value until attachments of real estate have been recorded in the registry of deeds”).   After all, the whole point of recording a lis pendens is to eliminate third party purchasers’ bona fides, thus keeping a mechanic’s lien (or a specific performance lawsuit) from becoming worthless in instances where a bona fide purchaser is about to close on the real estate before an attachment hearing with notice can be held.

Until the Topjian case is overturned or the statute is amended, recording a lis pendens won't perfect a mechanic's lien attachment; court approval will still be required in every case.  But RSA 511-A:8,III provides scant authority for getting it without notice, at least in the absence of "imminent danger of transfer to a bona fide third party" -- a qualification which is explicit in the first sentence of the subsection, and implicit in the second.  It is high time the courts stopped reading the second sentence as a blanket approval of ex parte mechanic's lien attachments.
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#59:  New Hampshire's "Right to Repair" Law

8/1/2017

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Like many states, New Hampshire has a so-called “right to repair” statute for residential construction defect cases. Found in RSA 359-G, it is intended to provide a period of time before a homeowner commences a lawsuit for the parties to attempt an out-of-court resolution, by giving the contractor a crack at making things right. But our statute has far less teeth than many other states' statutes. Here's how it works:

First, with the purchase and sales agreement or written contract for construction the contractor is supposed to give a written notice advising the homeowner of the statutory requirement for opportunity to repair defects. The penalty for failure to provide this notice? NONE. (In some states, the contractor loses his statutory opportunity to repair.)

Next, if the homeowner believes there has been defective work, before suing he or she is supposed to detail the problems in writing to the contractor. The penalty for failure to provide this notice prior to suit? Up to a 60-day “stay” of the lawsuit at the request of the contractor. (In some states the penalty is outright dismissal of the lawsuit.)

Next, within 30 days of receiving the homeowner notice of defects, the contractor may either (a) offer to settle the claim by monetary payment, the making of repairs, or a combination of both, without inspection; (b) propose to inspect the residence first; or (c) completely reject the claim (in which case the homeowner can sue immediately). If the contractor chooses (b) and gives notice that he wishes to inspect the premises before committing to anything, must the homeowner allow the inspection? Interestingly, the statute says that “homeowners are encouraged, but not required, to provide access for an inspection.” The penalty for not allowing one? NONE. (In some states, refusing the inspection bars a later suit entirely.)

If the contractor offers to make repairs (either initially or after an allowed inspection) and the homeowner accepts the offer, either the contractor will perform within the time frame agreed upon, or he won't. If he does perform, problem solved; no need for a lawsuit. If he doesn't, the homeowner can sue either for the original defects or for breach of the settlement agreement.

Unlike some states which give the contractor an absolute right to repair, in New Hampshire a homeowner can simply reject the contractor's settlement offer and file a lawsuit. At that point the statute threatens a mild penalty: if the homeowner doesn't win a judgment for more than the value of the repair offer, he must pay the contractor's “costs” (which do not include attorneys' fees) incurred in the lawsuit. If the homeowner wins nothing, obviously any repair offer was more valuable (but in that case, the contractor would be awarded his costs anyway as the prevailing party). But if the homeowner wins a judgment – presumably based on the cost of particular repairs – how does the contractor prove that the value of his repair offer exceeded the amount of that judgment? Surely he won't have testified that the homeowner's claimed damages were too low! And if the judgment is for the exact same repairs that the contractor offered to make, using the judgment to establish their value automatically means both figures will be exactly equal, and the contractor won't get his costs. This diminishes the sting of the “penalty.”

Perhaps the best feature of the statute is its list of things that a residential contractor will not be liable for: (a) normal shrinkage from drying or settlement; (b) reliance on information from the government or on building codes then in effect; (d) defects disclosed to the homeowner prior to purchase or that the homeowner should have discovered when buying the residence from a prior owner; (e) warranty items that the contractor tried to but wasn't allowed to address; (f) normal wear and tear; (g) items on which the homeowner did not perform normal and reasonable maintenance; (h) items that were altered by the homeowner. It is useful to have such a concise statement of contractor defenses, for both sides' benefit.

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#58:  Gathering Evidence for Proving or Defending a Contract Claim

7/1/2017

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If you are in the construction game long enough, sooner or later you are bound to get into a dispute over money allegedly owed under your contract, whether to you or by you. The issue could be as simple as whether proper performance of an agreed scope of work has occurred, or as complicated as whether a differing site condition has been encountered. Whatever the dispute, both the party seeking payment and the party defending against it should anticipate that it may ultimately land in the lap of an arbitrator, a judge or a jury. And before you lawyer up, you need to paper up.

Document management may be a pain, but the simple truth is that documents – paper or electronic – win cases. Contemporaneous records are the best evidence of what happened months or even years before the matter reaches trial. Documents are viewed as more trustworthy than witness testimony (even when the witness is also the author!) if for no other reason than the fact that the strongest memory is weaker than the palest ink.

Projects of any appreciable size naturally generate written records of various types, whether required by the contract or not, simply to effectively manage the project. A typical project file will include daily reports, correspondence (often by email these days), meeting minutes, internal memoranda, RFIs and responses thereto, change order requests, shop drawings and submittals, revisions to plans/specs/schedules, job photos or videos, and of course requisitions for payment with appropriate back-up.  Keeping them properly will improve your chances of prevailing on or against a claim.

The first and most obvious task is getting the right details documented. This goes far beyond collecting a signature from the owner's rep or the contractor's superintendent before embarking on a new task (which your contract may well require as a prerequisite to any price or time adjustment). A daily report that only recites the personnel and equipment on site, the portion of the job being worked on and the weather is less useful than one which notes any problems encountered or discussions surrounding them. A change order request which does no more than mention the aspect of the work that required additional effort is less useful than one which quotes chapter and verse from the plans and specs, includes a sketch or a photo, and compares in narrative form the initial plan of attack with the means and methods employed after the changed condition.

Timely documentation is the next most important consideration, as a writing cannot qualify as a “business record” admissible in court unless it was made “at or near the time” of the event it describes. If a verbal discussion includes a directive or a clarification that might involve extra time or money, it should be followed up with prompt confirming correspondence or with an accurate meeting minute. If a schedule is impacted by an added or deleted task or by a loss of productivity on an existing task, the schedule needs to be adjusted quickly. With men, materials and machinery moving around all the time, a job site photo taken tomorrow may not show precisely the same conditions as one taken today. No matter how pressed for time you are in the heat of battle, try not to let the sun set on an undocumented occurrence that may have financial consequences down the road. The longer you wait, the more of an afterthought it will look like, making your documentation appear far less indicative of a serious concern. No one is likely to be impressed with a “Well, I was too busy” excuse at trial, even if it is true.

Lastly, for any issue that may spawn a money fight down the road, prepare a separate “claims file” right away, into which copies of all of the foregoing documentation can be placed on a regular basis. This is far more efficient than trying to comb through thousands of pages for relevant information at the point of “going legal.” Why incur dozens of extra hours to separate the wheat from the chaff for your lawyer – or, God forbid, by your lawyer – down the road?
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#57:  The New AIA A201 (2017): Not Much Is Different

6/10/2017

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Every ten years, the American Institute of Architects revises and updates its standard form Owner-Contractor A-series documents, including the popular A201 General Conditions. The latest version released in April 2017 has some updates, rearranges some sections and tweaks some language – but by and large, the changes are rather minor.  A comparison of the 2017 and 2007 versions may be found here.

Some of the salient changes:

Revised Section 1.1.8 makes express what was formerly implied: that the Initial Decision Maker (typically the Architect) must be impartial to both the owner and the contractor, and shall not be liable for decisions made in good faith.

Revised Section 2.2 obliges the owner to provide “reasonable evidence” that it can fulfill its financial obligations under the contract. If that evidence is not provided, the contractor need not start work. If there is a change in the work “materially altering” the contract sum, upon written request the owner must provide updated financial information, failing which the contractor may refuse to perform the portion of the work affected by the change.

New Section 3.5.2 requires that all “material, equipment, or other special warranties required by the Contract documents” be issued in the owner’s name.

Revised Section 3.12.10.1 formally adopts the Spearin doctrine, entitling the contractor “to rely upon the adequacy and accuracy of the performance and design criteria provided in the Contract Documents,” while deleting the prior language that “the Contractor shall not be responsible for the adequacy of the performance and design criteria specified in the Contract Documents.”

Revised Section 7.4 allows the contractor to object to a “minor change” proposed by the architect if the contractor disagrees the the change will have no effect on Contract Price or Contract Time, and refuse to perform it until the effect is determined. Failure to object and proceeding with the change, however, waives a later claim for adjustment.

Article 11's Insurance and Bond provisions have been scaled back in favor of moving many of the 2007 form provisions to a new Insurance and Bond Exhibit that allows the parties to negotiate check-the-box insurance coverage requirements. Remaining provisions include a few changes: Section 11.1.1 requires the owner, architect and architect’s consultants to be named as additional insureds under the contractor’s CGL policy; Section 11.1.3 requires the contractor to provide a copy of any bonds to potential beneficiaries (e.g., subcontractors and suppliers looking for payment bonds) upon request; Section 11.1.4 and 11.2.3 require each party to notify the other of any lapse of insurance coverage that the party was required to carry within three business days; and Section 11.2.2 waives claims by the owner for any loss that would have been covered by insurance that the owner was required to procure but didn't.

New Section 15.1 adds what amounts to a statute of repose, providing that all claims must be asserted within 10 years after substantial completion. (New Hampshire's statute already limits claims to 8 years after substantial completion.)

Revised Section 15.2.6.1 now states that if a demand for mediation is made within 30 days after receipt of a decision from the Initial Decision Maker (rather than the former 60 days) and the other party fails to participate within 30 days of receipt, both mediation and the ability to challenge the Initial Decision are waived.

As always, using the AIA form simply sets default rules; the parties are free to modify them as they see fit. (Here's a bold prediction: the most deleted provision of the new 2017 A201 will be Section 1.7, which calls for the use of AIA Document E203 – 2013, Building Information Modeling (BIM) and Digital Data Exhibit. Going digital is a great idea – but for smaller projects, we're just not there yet.)

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#56:  Mechanic's Liens on Condominium Common Area

6/6/2017

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Condominium ownership has been on the rise since the 1970s, and there are now over 800 condominium developments in New Hampshire ranging in size from two units to several hundred units. Condo owners own not only their units, but a proportionate share of the grounds, facilities and the like – so-called “common area.” Decisions on common area maintenance and improvements are typically made by a homeowners' association; see RSA 356-B:41,I (“Except to the extent otherwise provided by the condominium instruments, all powers and responsibilities with regard to maintenance, repair, renovation, restoration, and replacement of the condominium shall belong (a) to the unit owners' association in the case of the common areas . . .”). If an association contracts for common area improvements but doesn't pay for them, how does the contractor go about getting a mechanic's lien? The answer may surprise you.

RSA 356-B:8,II provides: “Labor performed or materials furnished for the common areas, if duly authorized by the association of unit owners or board of directors in accordance with this chapter, the declaration or bylaws, shall be deemed to be performed or furnished with the express consent of each unit owner and shall be the basis for the filing of a lien pursuant to the lien law against each of the units . . .” The apparent effect of this statute is to require an attachment of each of the unit owners' proportionate interests in the common area. Whether or not suing the condo association that hired you (rather than suing each unit owner separately) is an allowable way to seek a money judgment, liening the association's interest in common area will not work – for the simple reason that the condo association has no such interest. Only the unit owners do.

When there are numerous unit owners in the condominium, this can get cumbersome. A contractor, subcontractor or supplier who wishes to perfect a mechanic's lien will often be obliged to name and serve dozens of parties. A subcontractor or supplier who wishes to give notice of intent to lien will often be obliged to send dozens of notices. Writs of attachments must be recorded against dozens of names. And so on. As one court has noted, “the cost and delay inherent in identifying, pleading against, and serving a multitude of owners (and then substituting a new owner for a predecessor during the pendancy of the case as units are sold or otherwise transferred) would be substantial.” Trintec Const., Inc. v. Countryside Village Condominium Association, Inc., 992 So.2d 277, 280 (Fla. App. 2008).

Fortunately for contractors, condo associations are required by statute to raise the money to pay for common area improvements; see RSA 356-B:45,III (mandating that all common expenses “shall be assessed against the condominium units”). Unfortunately, “such assessments shall be made by the unit owners' association annually, or more often if the condominium instruments so provide” – and they rarely do so provide, so a contractor expense not budgeted for at the previous annual meeting may have to wait to be paid. Fortunately, such unbudgeted contractor expenses almost always result from casualties or accidents that are required to be insured against “to the full replacement value of the structures within the condominium, or of such structures that in whole or in part comprise portions of the common areas,” RSA 356-B:43,I(a). Unfortunately, “structures” likely do not embrace sitework (e.g., washouts or tree damage from severe storms), which is therefore not required to be insured against.

If a mechanic's lien is recorded, unit owners may “remove their unit and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas appurtenant to such unit from the lien by payment of the fractional or proportional amounts attributable to each of the units affected,” RSA 356-B:8,II. But don't get too excited, contractors; this will typically happen only when there is a sale or a refinance afoot. Frankly, that scenario is the only way a mechanic's lien will ever provide leverage to a lienor – at least until someone figures out how to attract a buyer for an undivided proportionate common area interest at a sheriff's sale!

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